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1 INTRODUCTION 
Starting in Georgia 2003, several electoral revolutions have occurred in post-Soviet states 
where the authoritarian regime has either failed or strengthened its power. The electoral 
revolutions in the former Soviet states, widely called “colour revolutions”1, have followed 
the same pattern: opposition movements have occurred in authoritarian regimes and based 
on flawed elections they have risen against the political elite. In some of the cases, the 
authoritarian regime has tumbled over, in other the opposition movement has failed.  
 
The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, as well as other revolutions in the post-Soviet 
communities, was at their time considered as a step towards democracy. Still, as time has 
shown, the revolution became more a shift in power then a lovely walk down the 
democratic path.  The popular uprisings, many times praised by world leaders, were indeed 
steps towards breaking the post-Soviet path, but the result has more or less been 
disappointing. The revolution in Georgia did not bring democracy, surprisingly even 
Georgia’s democracy score fell2 during the years after the revolution and grew only in the 
end of the rule of president Mikheil Saakashvili, who was the main actor behind the 
revolution in 2003.  
 
Much research on colour revolutions has focused on the role of the state, the electoral 
model and international support (see e.g. Bunce and Wolchik, 2006a; Hale, 2006; Herd, 
2005, Hess, 2010). Still, one of the key figures, the opposition movement, has to some 
extent been left in the shadow. This thesis will analyse some parts of the opposition 
movement in Georgia during and after the Rose Revolution. The focus is set upon the 
organization of the movements, mobilization, existing formal and informal networks and 
collective identity. 
 
                                               
1The term “colour revolutions” has been widely used to describe the revolutions that have taken place in the 
former Soviet states but includes today as well as other revolutions around the world were the opposition uses 
a color or a symbol as an unifying object. The term “electoral revolution” would be more applicable, still 
some revolutions take place outside the electoral cycle.  
2 Democracy score for Georgia 2006-2012 as according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (Available: 
http://www.eiu.com. Last accessed: 21st April 2016) 
5 
 
 
 
There are two main research questions of this thesis: 
1. What are the characteristics of the opposition movement that occurred in Georgia 
after the Rose Revolution?  
2. Can the opposition be defined as a social mass movement or is it merely different 
actors working for different goals? 
Sub-questions of importance I believe might be answered along the way are: 
- What are the biggest problems in the Georgian society according to the opposition? 
- How has the Georgian political and civic society changed during 2003-2013? 
 
Theories on colour revolutions have claimed that the core of failure or success in electoral 
revolutions lies within the power of the opposition movements in creating political change 
(Hess, 2010). Yet, the opposition movement will also be depending on the weakness (or the 
power) of the authoritarian regime, the electoral model, the diffusion of ideas and the power 
of the opposition movement to mobilize citizens for demonstrations. Successful revolutions 
seem to occur in societies where the leaders are weak and the opposition strong, but not 
without the interference of Western ideas and actors (Herd, 2005). Is the success of the 
electoral revolution the, as many scholars hold, mostly connected to outbound factors as 
political system and international support, or are there internal factors within the 
movements themselves that can affect the outcome? Valuable research has been done on 
the revolutions in Georgia and the neighbouring countries (see e.g. Demes and Forbrig, 
2006; Ishiyama, and Kennedy, 2001; Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009; Margarian, 2007; 
McFaul, 2006; Ruiz-Rufino, 2008; Sahakyan and Atanesyan, 2006; Valiyev, 2006; Way, 
2008). With this thesis I want to take the question deeper, to the participants and leaders of 
organizations involved in so-called anti-governmental actions. What are the characteristics 
of the opposition movements and can its structure be defined? Is it a movement or rather 
different actors taking their causes to the streets? The analysis will be based on explorative 
interviews with participators from the different parts of the opposition movements, both 
active in Georgia during the revolution in 2003 and afterwards.   
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2 BACKGROUND AND PUZZLE 
In November 2003 Mikheil Saakashvili followed by thousands of Georgian demonstrators 
made it to the steps of the parliament hall in Tbilisi. The demonstrators, with roses in their 
hands, demanded incumbent president Eduard Shevardnadze’s resignation. Soon not only 
the president resigned, but opposition movement leader Saakashvili was elected the new 
president of Georgia in January 2004. The revolution, soon to be named the Rose 
Revolution or Revolution of Roses, became the first among many electoral revolutions (as 
well as outside the electoral cycle) in the post-Soviet countries. During the following year 
revolutions, some successful other not, in post-Soviet states have appeared also in Ukraine 
(2004, 2014), Kyrgyzstan (2005, 2010), Azerbaijan (2005), Uzbekistan (2005), Belarus 
(2006), Armenia (2008) and Moldova (2009). 
 
2.1 Independent Georgia 
After regaining independence in the beginning of the 1990s, the democratization process in 
Georgia was under way. Still, as Fairbanks (2004) points out, nationalistic ideas fuelled the 
independence movements in Georgia and this resulted in complications for structural 
reforms and institutionalization. The country was also through the 90s and into the 21st 
century scarred with territorial disputes over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The first 
president of post-Soviet Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was soon thrown out of office and 
replaced by the former first secretary for the Communist Party in Soviet Georgia and the 
former minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze. After the 
return of Shevardnadze, the opposition in Georgia became loyal to the first independent 
president of Georgia, Gamsakhurdia, and became so a threat to the new president. The 
government of Georgia addressed the threats of the quite effective opposition by forming a 
government party, the Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG). Shevardnadze was re-elected in 
1996 and 2000. Political status quo was not shaken throughout the years and the 
Shevardnadze regime kept the presidential party together. In the local elections in 2002, 
CUG began to fall apart while Shevardnadze did not seem interested in intervening. Only in 
Tbilisi, the opposition parties made landslide victories and CUG was almost wiped out of 
the political scene. (Fairbanks, 2004.) 
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Fairbank (2004) compares the history in Georgia and Azerbaijan after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. In both of the countries, the first independence movements were considered 
democratic winds blowing liberal ideas into the former closed societies. The first national 
leaders, Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia and Abulfaz Elchibey in Azerbaijan could still not 
support the development into democratic states and soon former communists (Eduard 
Shevardnadze in Georgia and Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan) took over the rule of the 
countries (Fairbank, 2004). 
 
2.2 The Georgian Rose Revolution in 2003 
Tudoroiu (2007) describes Georgia under Shevardnadze as a chaotic country with around 
20 percent of Georgia’s territory beyond the control of Tbilisi.  The territories of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia was under Russian influence, and the region of Adjara was beyond the 
control of the capital. After the presidential elections in 2000 both Shevardnadze’s and his 
party CUG’s support began to erode. The parliamentary elections in 2003 brought new 
opposition parties and faces to the political life. Some of the most important faces were 
Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, Shalva Natelashvili and Nino Burjanadze. The new 
opposition leaders did campaign mostly independently, but also participated as a group in 
demonstrations against Shevardnadze and the CUG government. Already in the 
parliamentary election of 2003, Mikheil Saakashvili showed excellent skills in addressing 
different social layers of the Georgian society (Fairbanks, 2004). Both Saakashvili and 
Natelashvili used a language that addressed nationalists and on a more or less populist base, 
they promised the people a future that would that would have costed excessively much for 
the Georgian national budget (Tudoroiu, 2007). The fraudulent parliamentary elections3 on 
2 November 2003 fuelled the opposition in its demonstrations against the Shevardnadze 
regime. A series of nonviolent mass protests followed in Tbilisi and around Georgia. 
Shevardnadze chose to not use violence against the demonstrators but called on the leader 
of the region of Adjara, Aslan Abashidze, to organize counter-demonstration in Tbilisi, still 
this counter-demonstration did not have any effect on the opposition movement (Tudoroiu, 
                                               
3 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report on the Georgian parliamentary elections in 2013. 
(Available: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/22205?download=true. Last accessed: 15th March 
2016) 
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2007).  
 
Shevardnadze was considered to repeat the irregularities of the 2000 presidential elections, 
but nobody had expected the scale of fraud (Tudoroiu, 2007). After the election day of 
November 2, the opposition refused to accept the outcome and protesters began to gather in 
front of the Georgian parliament building in Tbilisi. The opposition still had not been able 
to unify under one flag: 
“[T]ensions between rival opposition groups remained strong. While Saakashvili called for the 
president’s resignation the Burjanadze Democrats initially demanded only new elections. The 
Labour and New Rights, on another hand, opposed the demonstrations from the very start …” 
(Mitchell in Tudoroiu, 2007, p. 321).  
When Shevardnadze opened the new legislative session in November 2003, Saakashvili 
together with his supporters took over the building with roses in their hands. The rose so 
became to symbolize the nonviolence of the Georgian opposition and the peaceful 
overtaking of the parliament (Fairbanks, 2004). The incumbent president Shevardnadze 
declared a state of emergency but was the next day forced to resign and Saakashvili was 
elected president in January 2004. Saakashvili came into office with a support of 96 percent 
of the votes and the elections were considered free but arranged in a very short timeframe 
and without real political opponents4. New parliamentary elections were held in March 
2004 where the former opposition party came to power and Zhvania was appointed as 
Prime Minister and Burjanadze as the speaker of the Parliament (Tudoroiu, 2007).  
 
One of the key figures in the Georgian Rose Revolution was the youth moment Kmara, 
which can be compared to other youth movements taking part in colour revolutions. In 
Serbia during the revolution in year 2000 the youth movement Otpor! (Resistance!) was 
active, and in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 Pora! (It is time!) gained much 
publicity. Tudoroiu (2007, p. 322) also points out, that “[a]t least in part, the November 
2003 events were possible because a number of prominent NGOs such as the Liberty 
Institute were trained in the methods and tactics of non-violent political opposition to 
                                               
4 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report on the Georgian extraordinary presidential election in 
2014. (Available: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/24600?download=true. Last accessed: 20th 
April 2016) 
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authoritarian leaders by Serbian NGOs like the Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and 
Strategies (CANVAS) and the Center for Non-Violent Resistance”. The connections 
between the youth movements in Serbia and post-Soviet states have been confirmed by 
among other Herd (2005) who shows that the Belgrade-based Center for Nonviolent 
Resistance has trained activists at least in Georgia, Belarus and Ukraine. Herd (2005, p. 4) 
claims, that “[t]he networks and relationships among these groups were consolidated by the 
sharing of media outlets, public relations campaigns, and organizational knowledge.”. He 
further refers to the relations between the former Serbian Otpor’s leaders who have worked 
with Ukrainian activist (with support from Freedom House). This resulted in that the 
learning-process including organizational skills and the opening of local offices, marketing 
skills and the creation of a logo and symbols as well as the skills to identify the weaknesses 
in the Ukrainian society and how to address these problems with a key message and slogans 
became objects for diffusion between the two organizations (Herd, 2005). 
 
2.3 Pressure from abroad 
As Tudoroiu (2007, p. 322) points out: “Shevardnadze’s fall was totally unexpected. For 
the first time a post-Communist regime inside the Commonwealth of Independent States 
was overthrown by a democratic movement; hence the prompt use of the term 
‘Revolution.’”. As will be see further on in the thesis, the organization leaders of e.g. 
Kmara and Liberty Institute did not have the goal to overthrow the regime, and even for 
them the final stage of the revolution came as a surprise. The revolution did still not emerge 
in a vacuum. Foreign funding cannot be overlooked as one of the reasons for the drastic 
shift in Georgia. Shevardnadze had allowed Western economic aid to flow into the country 
and the Georgian free media and civil society had developed under Western influence and 
support. For example, from 1992 until the revolution, Georgia received over 1400 million 
US$5 in direct aid from the US government and US Agency for International Development 
(USAID). As Tudoroiu (2007) points out, much of this aid (the US aid but also direct aid 
from the European Union member states) went directly to the development of the civil 
                                               
5 USAID Overseas Loands and Grants to Georgia.  
(Available: http://us-foreign-aid.insidegov.com/l/65/Georgia. Last accessed: 20th April 2016) 
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society, democratic institutions and NGOs. Here the role of George Soros’ Open Society 
Institute (OSI) has to be mentioned. As Tudoroiu (2007, p. 323) points out, not only did the 
OSI finance the development of NGOs that were active during the revolutionary November 
of 2003, the Soros foundation actually “promoted the ‘Serbian model’ of peaceful regime 
change.” It was through money and support from the OSI that politicians and student 
activists travelled to Serbia to learn how to overthrow an authoritarian regime, among these 
“revolutionary students” was also Mikheil Saakashvili (Fairbanks, 2004). Fairbanks (2004) 
also claims, that OSCE, the U.S. Government, the OSI and the EU all were active actors 
and direct or indirect supporters of the opposition, or at least eager to point and reveal the 
enormous electoral fraud. 
 
Herd (2005) has also researched the involvement of Western interests during the Rose 
Revolution in Tbilisi. According to Herd (2005) the involvement of Western interest during 
the years before the electoral revolutions includes CNVR (Center for Non-Violent 
Resistance), FH (Freedom House), NDI (National Democracy Institute), EU (European 
Union), OSI (Open Society Institute), NED (National Endowment for Democracy), IRI 
(International Republican Institute), OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe), USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), CoE (Council of Europe) 
and foreign security services and embassies (U.S. (CIA), UK (MI6), and Germany (BND). 
 
The allegations on American involvement continued in Ukraine the next year during the 
Orange Revolution. In the Ukrainian case, huge investments had been made to secure the 
victory of the opposition leader Viktor Yushchenco (Herd, 2005). Herd (2005), who has 
compared the level of Western “manufacture” in the revolutionary movements, discusses in 
what extent the revolutions are movements on export. Herd asks himself if the chain 
reaction will continue, and how far? As we today know, the import of colour revolutions in 
other post-Soviet states has not been as successful as Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004. In 
this light, it also interesting to see the urgent resistance of the Russian government against 
foreign involvement and support inside its own territorial borders. Revolutions and its ideas 
are object for diffusion and export, and so the knowledge can be used to both support and 
repress.  
11 
 
 
2.4 Post-revolutionary Georgia 
It has to be stated, that revolution do not automatically lead to democracy. The level of 
democratization the colour revolutions actually bring has been questioned among other by 
Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009). The authors consider the Rose Revolution in Georgia as 
a good example on an electoral revolution where electoral fraud is addressed by the masses 
(and with a popular leader) but the incumbent regime rather just only gets a new face and 
deep reforms for democratization are overseen. The Georgian Rose revolution indeed 
succeeded, but democratization stagnated anyway.  
 
When Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia after the Rose Revolution, it was 
widely interpreted, that Georgia was now on the path of freedom and democracy. Georgia’s 
freedom, civil liberties and political rights rating did increase in the beginning, but already 
in 2007-2008, the situation got worse6. In September 2007, for the first time since the Rose 
Revolution, rather big non-government protests emerged in Georgia with their peak on 7th 
of November 2011 concluding in a state of emergency. Up to 100 000 protesters gathered 
in Tbilisi demanding Saakashvili to resign. The president met the protesters’ demands by 
announcing early presidential elections for January 2008. Nevertheless, the ruling elite was 
accused for imposing state of emergency, closing off opposition media and clashes with the 
protesters. Saakashvili won the presidential elections in January 2008, as well his party 
continued to rule after the parliamentary elections in May 2008. (Freedom House, 2008). 
 
Tbilisi saw following mass demonstrations in April 2009. The goal of the protests was the 
same as in 2007, president Saakashvili’s resignation. The protests did still not gather as 
much participants as in 2007, and the demonstration petered out in the summer. (Freedom 
House, 2010). The last bigger anti-government demonstrations during the rule of 
Saakashvili took place in May 2011 (at the time of gathering data for this thesis). Until the 
end of May, the protesters clashed with riot police and the Georgian society returned to 
status quo.  
                                               
6 Freedom, civil liberties and political rights ratings from Freedom House’s annual reports on Georgia. 
(Available: https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia. Lasta accessed: 15th April 2016) 
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President Saakashvili’s rule was a fight against corruption and massive reforms to 
modernize Georgia. Still, Saakashvili has broadly been criticized for use of excessive force 
against protesters, his role in the Georgia-Russia War in August 2008 and prison scandals. 
The electoral process and political pluralism was however established in Georgia, and the 
ruling elite lost in the Georgian parliament elections in 2012 against the party Georgian 
Dream. The loss for Saakashvili’s United National Movement meant that his era as 
president was ending. Saakashvili was not running for a third term in the Georgian 
president in 2013 and left the country for the US. In 2015, he was appointed as the head of 
the International Advisory Council of Reforms of Ukraine and later as the Governor of 
Odessa region. 
 
2.5 What is a revolution? 
McFaul (2006) has defined a revolution in the 21st century as beginning from a fraudulent 
election that creates political instability and massive protests. As a consequence of the 
fraudulent election, the opposition gathers and uses extra constitutional means such as mass 
protest to protest against the election output. Due to the political instability created both the 
incumbent leader(s) as well as the opposition leader(s) declare their authority and victory 
leading to further political conflicts. In the political conflicts taking place after that both 
sides have declared victory none of the sides are supposed to use violence. (McFaul, 2006.) 
As class and violence, which have traditionally been the two central elements in 
revolutions, are less and less present in the revolutions of the 21st century, the age of “real 
revolutions” has come to an end (Tudoroiu, 2007). The use of electronic media and 
pressure from outside during the reform process in societies of the 21st century so creates 
“revelections” or “refolution”, not actual “revolutions” as the term has been traditionally 
interpreted (Tudoroiu, 2007, p. 317). Tudoroiu so concludes, that 
 “[t]he present concept of revolution can be considered as having little or no relation with class, 
violence or ‘anti-reactionary’ orientation. Rather, it concerns a change of Weltanschauung [the 
victory of a world view] caused by a major political regime change. Its most likely instruments 
are mass civil disobedience and/or electoral process.” (Tudoroiu, 2007, p. 318).  
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Following the definition of Tudoroiu, it is so questionable to use the term “revolution” in 
the cases of the CIS-countries. The nature of the successful electoral revolutions in 
countries as Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan could so more be considered as deep 
reforms, as the structures of the former regimes have remained with only the faces changed. 
In this research, I will still use terms as revolution, electoral revolution and colour 
revolution as these terms are used by scholars all over the world. Still, the colour 
revolutions should not be interpreted or compared with the revolutions in Eastern Europe 
during the fall of Soviet Union or historical revolutions. Kalandadze and Orenstein’s (2009, 
p. 1409) definition of a successful colour revolution so stands as: 
“…cases in which the demonstrations achieved their original objectives or more – namely, the 
rerunning of the election, the nullification of the election results, and/or the resignation of the 
incumbent – and in which the subsequent change of leadership, from an undemocratic 
incumbent to new democratic forces, occurred as a direct result of the electoral protests.”  
 
2.6 Puzzle of reasons and actors 
While scholars have urgently tried to describe and examine the surrounding factors for 
what kind of society a successful revolution should be acting in, one of the central figure 
has many times become a peripheral factor. The aim is so to, some extent, address this gap 
in the research on colour revolutions. The thesis will analyse a part of the opposition 
movement in Georgia: organizations that have occurred clearly as parts of opposition 
politics as well as other organizations not directly political. My aim is to present the 
activities, techniques and goals of Georgian opposition movements during the revolution in 
2003 as well as after. The participants are so in the centre of attention.  
 
The main youth movement involved in the Rose Revolution, Kmara, was still after the 
revolution functioning though its focus changed. My plan with my research was mainly to 
meet with members of Kmara and gather information about the movement. Still, arriving in 
Georgia and discussing the matter with former members, professors and activists I 
understood the puzzle is more diffuse then literature on the theme had provided. My focus 
so changed to other organizations as well. 
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Why then not focusing on the events of November 2003, but also the development 
afterwards? The Rose Revolution happened in 2003, but the process of revolution 
continued until 2013 when Saakashvili left office. Several attempts to revolt against the 
revolutionaries have taken place during the years of Saakashvili’s rule. The revolution so 
gave birth to new revolutions. It has been proposed, that even if the colour revolutions 
many times have been considered as victories of democracy, they have not been able to 
support the development of neither the civil society nor the transition to democratic rule 
(see e.g. Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009). Is this because the revolution is actually a 
product of a society and transition, i.e. an end product and not a start for a democratic way? 
Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009, p. 1404) argue that the reason why the democratic 
reforms stagnate is “…because electoral revolutions are more often symptoms of the 
problems of hybrid and authoritarian regimes, rather than solutions to their ills.”. The 
electoral revolutions often focus on the electoral fraud itself and do not add efforts to the 
rebuilding of the society and e.g. fight against corruption. My goal is therefore to describe 
some elements of electoral revolution in 2003 and the ongoing revolution afterwards, not 
democracy per se. Another reason why focusing on the timeframe 2003-2013 is that many 
organizations, politicians and political parties supporting/opposing the political elite (before 
2003: Shevardnadze, after 2003: Saakashvili) have changed sides. Many of Saakashvili’s 
supporters have moved back into opposition (or been thrown out), others, who were 
supporting Shevardnadze, have come to support Saakashvili.  
 
The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 can be considered a successful electoral revolution 
as the opposition (mass movement, demonstrators etc.) achieved their goal (e.g. confirmed 
electoral fraud, re-election and the resignation of the ruling power) and this happens on the 
basis of protests (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009). As already stated, the Georgian case do 
not stand alone but as first among many in a diffusion of revolutionary ideas in the post-
Soviet sphere. The cases are not isolated events for the Caucasus. As Tudoroiu (2007, p. 
335) comments concerning the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan: “Explicitly 
inspired by the Serbian movement that led to Milosevic’s fall in 2000, they represent a clear 
example of international diffusion.”   
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3 FORMER REASERCH  
There are some leading theories that have been used in research on why the electoral 
movements have succeeded or failed; the learning model of Bunce and Wolchik, Way’s 
model of authoritarian instability and Hale’s window of opportunity. The interests of 
Western states and organizations have often been considered to be crucial to the outcome of 
the colour revolutions. Further, diffusion of ideas has also been considered as some of the 
reasons electoral movements have occurred in countries that have a common history (as 
e.g. former Soviet-states) and are geographically close to each other. As my thesis will 
focus on movements and participation, the theory will be drawn from social movement 
theory and will be presented in chapter 4. Social movement theory is an interdisciplinary 
study within the social sciences that generally seeks to explain why social mobilization 
occurs, the forms under which it manifests, as well as potential social, cultural, and political 
consequences. Collectively mobilized resources have been shown to play a significant role 
in the demonstrations against different regimes around the world.  
 
Much research on the topic has focused on the diffusion of revolutionary and democratic 
ideas as well as democratization of post-Soviet countries. Much effort has been made to 
describe the role of the authoritarian regime, the role of diffusion and the role of the civil 
society (see e.g. Bunce & Wolchik, 2006a; Watanabe, 2007; Kalandadze & Orenstein, 
2009). The study will not cover the fields already researched (authoritarian regime etc.) but 
focus on the key actor, the electoral movement itself, which somehow has been left in the 
shadow. As already mentioned, the priority of this thesis is neither to evaluate the level of 
democracy, or if electoral revolutions even can be considered to be part of the 
democratization process in a certain country. 
 
Hess (2010) has compared the authoritarian regimes and the activities of the opposition 
movements during the electoral revolutions in the 2005 parliament elections in Kyrgyzstan 
and the 2008 Armenian presidential election. Hess (2010, p. 38) finds, “that among theories 
seeking to explain the causes of color revolutions, those that place primary agency on the 
strength or weakness of authoritarian ruling regimes and their institutions for maintaining 
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in-party elite cohesion, strong and highly institutionalized political parties, and effective, 
experienced security forces, have the greatest explanatory value.”. He further considers that 
political crisis, the support from international actors (both moral and financial) and 
democracy-promotion efforts are not enough to effect the regime change if the regime 
obsesses strong and efficient security forces that are loyal to the political regime (Hess, 
2010). His comparison only include Kyrgyzstan and Armenia but these conclusions could 
also be applied on other electoral revolutions in post-Soviet regimes during the same time 
span. Besides the three leading theories, also other factors should be taken into account, for 
Georgia some main factors would be democratization, Western interests and the Russian 
response.  
 
3.1 Leading theories on electoral revolutions  
According to the first theory, the electoral model, the opposition movements learn from 
other movements in their own country and abroad and by using the tactics, they become 
effective in their local surrounding. In many cases, these movements also receive outside 
financial support. Applying these tactics and using the international support (both financial 
and moral), the opposition leaders have been able to mobilize the voters into the streets and 
overturning the political regime. (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006a.) 
 
The second theory focuses not so much on the strategic learning of the opposition 
movement as on the authoritarian instability/stability (Way, 2008). If the ruling authority 
has control over economic resources and the support of (and control over) institutionalized 
parties and security forces it will most likely prevail the revolutions occurring. In countries 
where the links to West are strong or if there are strong interests (e.g. the Baltic States and 
Eastern European countries on the eve of the fall of Soviet Union) the Western states are to 
encourage the regime change and support the opposition movement both financially and by 
political means. If these links are missing, the focus will be on the authoritarian regime and 
by which means they can oppose the opposition movement. The core of the success to 
oppose the revolutionary actions lies within the power the authoritarian regime has over the 
political system by monopolized decision-making (single party system or ruling party with 
the opposition just in the periphery). (Hess, 2008; Way, 2008)  
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As Hess argues, “[h]aving a strong, well-institutionalized party thus makes it unlikely that 
an authoritarian regime will fragment when facing opposition post-election protests” (Hess, 
2010, p. 29). As well, the authoritarian regime will use the loyalty of its security forces to 
protect itself against the opposition movement. In addition, state ownership of enterprises 
and economical resources supports the regime to remain at power as the regime is able to 
starve opposition parties and pay off both loyalist and crucial rivals. (Way, 2008) 
 
According to the third theory, certain personalities gain support and recognition during the 
electoral crisis when the window of opportunity opens (Hale, 2006). This theory is focusing 
on the role of the president. In many authoritarian regimes, the power elite is highly 
depended on the good will of the president, who has extensive power and resources. These 
resources he/she will use to pay off both allies and rivals, be in control over the economic 
resources of the elite and the opposition and suppress or support (according to his/her own 
will and interests) organizations and parties. Because of the elite’s dependence on the 
president’s personal favour, allies are quite unlikely to join rivals’ parties. Still, if the 
incumbent president’s power decreases, or the president shows will to leave the office, the 
network of supporters will most likely unravel and the struggle for power begin. When this 
window of opportunity opens, the former power elite may be willing to join the 
opposition’s camp as space will be opened for mobilization and revolutionary movements. 
As this happens, the new opposition will not just be formed by former rivals to the 
president but also by insiders from the president’s supporting political elite. Hale, 2006; 
Hess, 2010.)  
 
3.2 The failure of democratization through colour revolutions 
Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) have analysed cases of electoral revolutions worldwide 
from 1991 to 2009 and find that successful revolutions do not automatically mean that the 
development of democratization will flourish in the country in question. They find that not 
does only the progress of democratization not take place in successful cases of electoral 
revolutions, but “[countries] where electoral revolutions ended unsuccessfully demonstrate 
no discernible impact on subsequent regime dynamics.” (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009, 
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p. 1404). The reason why electoral revolutions does not imply democratization is, 
according to Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009, pp. 1404-1405),  
“because electoral revolutions are more often symptoms of the problems of hybrid and 
authoritarian regimes, rather than solutions to their ills. … While focusing on electoral fraud 
and the general democratic deficit of political rights and civil liberties in an effort to build a 
broad anti-regime coalition, they [opposition] do not resolve deeper issues of corruption, 
clientelism, underdeveloped political parties, and lack of transparent decision making.”.  
The Georgian case demonstrates according to them, “how electoral revolutions tend to be 
narrow in scope, highlighting surface-level democratic deficiencies such as the elections 
but not focusing as much on the deeper institutional and structural problems of the regime.” 
(Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009, p. 1410). The Georgian case is also a good example on 
an electoral revolution that was praised by many to be a victory for democracy to more or 
less be a democratic failure. As Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009, p. 1410) points out, the 
new president Saakashvili was elected on a “populist platform, and although he certainly 
had a state-building agenda, he had no clear democratizing program”, what later became 
the beginning for new protests. Interestingly in the post-Soviet sphere, the Tulip Revolution 
Kyrgyzstan has not only after the revolution failed to credit the society with democratic 
ideas, the revolution itself had “no clear and ambitious reform goals; in fact, it has been 
remarkably leaderless and programless, even in comparison with the other successful 
revolutions.” (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009, p. 1411). The conclusions Kalandadze and 
Orenstein (2009) so make are that fraudulent elections and unpopular incumbent leaders are 
just the tip of the iceberg of national problems. The political culture does not develop very 
fast in countries with successful revolutions, and power conflicts, corruption and lack of 
rule of law continues. Secondly, the revolutions address mostly the fraudulent elections and 
some visible lack of civil liberties. Still, they tend to be program less and there is no agenda 
for the development of the country. Thirdly, the power distribution does not become more 
democratic. As Kalandadze and Orenstein, concludes: “Electoral revolutions are powerful 
moments of mass protest and civic participation, but their overall lack of effectiveness 
requires rethinking this strategy of democratization.” (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009, p. 
1421)  
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Tudoroiu (2007) who has researched the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan 
holds that the weakness of the civil society was the problem that the democratic process in 
the countries did not develop after the revolutions. The civil society helped to aggregate the 
protest movements, but according to Tudoroiu (2007), this is all the civil society did. The 
movements were according to him “initiated, led, controlled, and finally subordinated by 
former members of the authoritarian regime’s political elite.” (Tudoroiu, 2007, p. 316). 
This is why Tudoroiu considers the three mentioned revolutions only as struggle for power 
between former and incumbent political elite, and even considers the revolutions as 
“nothing more than failed” (Tudoroiu, 2007, p. 316). Tudoroiu (2007, p. 336) further 
claims, that for a successful revolution  
“the most important element is the existence of a moderately authoritarian regime … [strongly 
authoritarian regimes] have the capacity to suppress brutally protest movements in their initial 
phase … This implicitly means that there are very few chances of further revolutions inside the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, as most of the remaining states fall in the category of 
strongly authoritarian regimes.”  
Sahakyan and Atanesyan (2006) focus on the role of leaders and points out is that many 
times old Soviet leader can make comeback in the new political system, and with success. 
Many new “democratic leaders” that have been trained in West can be seen as naïve in the 
eyes’ of the people while the old guard is considered to have experience and the same 
mentality as most of the ordinary population not being taught the “ideas of the West”. 
Coming close to core of the problem why the electorate is not willing to support the 
democratic alternatives can be concluded in one sentence of Sahakyan and Atanesyan 
(2006, p. 354): “People do not think they need ideologies; what they need is real 
improvements in their lives.”.  
 
3.3 Western interests 
The interests of Western states and organizations have often been considered crucial to the 
outcome of the colour revolutions. Herd (2005), who has researched the level of Western 
manufacturing of the colour revolutions (and the Russian response), holds that, “[t]his 
expectation seems rather overblown, distorted by euphoria over the Ukrainian victory 
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unmodified by more considered judgment. Opposition movements throughout the CIS may 
well have been emboldened by the events in Tbilisi and Kyiv.” (Herd, 2005, p. 12). While 
Western organizations do support the development of free and fair elections throughout the 
CIS, the “idea” that West is trying to export democratic idea through international 
organizations and NGOs with the colour revolutions as catalyst is according to Herd (2005) 
allegations that still have not been proved. The theory of allegations he backs up by 
showing that even if some states and NGOs are working for the spreading of democratic 
ideas and liberal rights, they are not working uniformly or under the same agenda (Herd, 
2005). Further, he holds that it impossible for international NGOs or other organizations to 
outsource revolutions as the local civic organizations and personalities cannot be imported; 
the source of the revolution is so according to Herd (2005) in the country itself.  
 
3.4 Russia’s response 
The Russian Federation has felt itself insecure while watching the colourful revolutions 
moving through the CIS-countries. The coup d’état attempts in Yerevan, Baku and Minsk 
have risen nervous voices in Kremlin as well – when will the “American velvet revolution” 
reach the capital of Russia? On the eve of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Andrei 
Vladimirov commented in the Itogi magazine: “The day before yesterday: Belgrade. 
Yesterday: Tbilisi. Today: Kyiv. Tomorrow: Moscow.” (in Herd, 2005, p. 5). The 
allegations on the support from Western organization were, by no surprise, also most 
spread in Russia and the battle was not just about Kyiv or Tbilisi but also for the whole 
Commonwealth of Independent States. According to Herd (2005), Gleb Pavlovsky, 
president of the Moscow-based Foundation for Effective Politics and political consultant to 
Viktor Yanukovych’s presidential campaign in Ukraine 2004, has compared the recent 
events in the Serbia and the CIS-countries with the interference of the White House in 
Latina America during the cold war. Moscow still considers the CIS-countries as their 
sphere of interest, and the electoral revolutions are therefore being interpreted as a threat 
and planned strike against Mother Russia herself. As more and more CIS-countries show 
interest in Western ideas and protest against incumbent leaders that are on good terms with 
Kremlin, the Russian political elite feels that Russia is being encircled not by democracy or 
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other ideology, but of Western interests. That’s why “[f]ear persists that Russia will one 
day find itself surrounded by states that are members of NATO and the EU” and “Russia’s 
president also accused the United States of being a “pseudo-democratic” dictatorship and 
lashed out at the “colonial” behaviour of the West in Eastern Europe” (Herd, 2005, p. 7).  
Concerning the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 2004 and the split between Russians and 
Ukrainians in the country Herd (2005, p. 14) claims that Moscow has no-one else then itself 
to blame: “[Putin’s] policy itself constituted a self-inflicted wound.”. Herd (2005) so 
concludes concerning the myth that West is monitoring and creating colour revolutions on 
export to CIS:  
“the West lacks the ability, never mind, the political will, to conduct such ‘special operations’ 
… The real threat to authoritarian regimes does not come from foreign NGOs working in 
concert with Western security forces, but simply from foreign NGOs working inside the 
country.” (Herd, 2005, p. 14).  
While many scholars (see e.g. Bunce and Wolchik, 2006a) consider that the former Soviet 
Union has become an area for democratization through electoral revolution, Kalandadze 
and Orenstein (2009) do find that the colour revolutions is not a lonely post-communist 
phenomena. Electoral revolutions and coup d’état attempts are taking place in other parts of 
the world as well, especially in Africa. Kalandadze and Orenstein conclude:  
“What makes electoral revolutions unique is the presence of mass protests in favor of adherence 
to a key feature of democracy: free and fair elections that give the opposition the opportunity to 
win. The fact that the people come into the streets to defend their democratic rights give 
electoral revolutions a sense of legitimacy, internally and internationally, that many other 
protests lack.” (Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009, p. 1406). 
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4 SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH 
As the main theories on electoral revolutions in the former Soviet Union have been 
presented in the previous chapter, we know need a theoretical framework to approach the 
Georgian opposition movement. This framework will mainly be based on the ideas of 
scholars as Tilly, Tarrow, Uhlin, Della Porta and Diani.  
 
Tilly and Tarrow (2007) argue, that treating mass movements as just one homogenous 
group is a too narrow view on the subject. In their research on the role of mass movements 
in contentious politics, they divide the mass movement into two camps; base for social 
movements and campaign done by a social movement (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). This 
division indicates, that even if there is an established network for social mass movements 
(base) that is trying to achieve political change it is first and only when the movement has a 
member base, is enough diversified and stable a successful campaign can happen (Tilly and 
Tarrow, 2007). A part of this campaign is mobilizing resources, which has been shown to 
play a significant role in demonstration against different regimes around the world (see e.g. 
Andrews et al., 2010). Not just the way citizens are organized, but also the final goal for 
mobilization and the way of using their influence helps them form into successful 
movements (Andrews et al., 2010). Social protest organized by a movement struggling for 
social or political change should further not only be considered as a specific feature of mass 
movements, but “rather an option, open to a much broader range of actors when they feel 
their relative position in the political process [has] come under threat.”  (Della Porta and 
Diani, 2006, p. 28).  
 
In researching mass movements, we are so facing the broader framework that could, 
according to Tilly and Tarrow (2007), be divided into base and campaign. When dealing 
with the base for the mass movements possible questions we could use are 1) What are the 
underlying reasons for action? 2) Who are the actors? 3) How has mobilization been 
organized? Accordingly, when dealing with the campaign for the movement we would ask 
us 4) What actions are being taken? 5) What is the goal of the campaign? 6) What is the 
reaction? The inner framework for mass movements, mobilization and political action is 
therefore both complex and diversified. Andrews et. al. (2010, p. 1194) so ask for a 
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“multidimensional effectiveness models that address their [civic associations’] distinctive 
qualities” and introduce the term “organizational effectiveness” to the discussion to explain 
why some mass movements are more successful than others.  
 
Actions (demonstrations, political activism etc.) in themselves are not enough, there has to 
be a base on which social campaign can evolve. Still, the movement will not emerge in a 
vacuum, and as has been discussed in previous chapters much research has focused on the 
external frames within which the movement occurs (political system, level of freedom, 
electoral models etc.). Also Uhlin (2006, p. 31) has pointed out that “[t]he concept of 
political opportunities, however, can easily be used for almost any kind of contextual 
factors having an impact on social movements. Such a broad and vague conception is of 
little help”. Uhlin (2006, p. 31) so list three main dimensions of political opportunities: the 
relative openness or closure of the formal political system; the presence or absence of elite 
allies; the state leadership’s capacity for, and willingness to use, repression.  
 
4.1 The study of social mass movements – a historical overlook 
The 1960s saw a dramatic transformation in the study of social movements. Critics had 
lamented the study of social movements as the research area was considered lacking theory. 
Parallel with the development of social movements around the word in the 1960s (e.g. 
American civil rights and anti-war movements, the May 1968 revolt in France and rising 
environmental and women’s movements), so the study of social movements developed into 
a major area of research. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.) 
 
Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 14) observe, that in the early discussion on social 
movements and collective actions, actions were defined as “rational, purposeful, and 
organized”. As well, the central term class was for long considered one of the main 
underlying reasons as a base for social movements to occur. Today the definition may have 
become more blur, mainly because relations between organization, network and 
mobilization have been included in the framework. Tilly (2002) has among others argued 
that the study of social movement has entered a new era and the scheme researchers today 
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have is more complicated and overlapping then some decades ago. Tilly so contends, that 
“[t]he shift in orientation leads to an understanding of social movements as strongly 
patterned transactions within interlocking networks” (Tilly, 2002, p. 80). The determination 
of forms and intensity of collective actions has broadly been connected to the political 
opportunities as well as the political and institutional realities in which the social 
movements operate (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 16). Della Porta and Diani (2006) 
further consider that while the social structure of the society has changed, the welfare state 
has developed, labour mobility has expanded and economic globalization has become a 
challenge for the state in the 21st century, so has also social fragmentation (continued) to 
affect collective action and social change. The working class has so expanded, while socio-
politico-economic cleavages have remained (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). The shift in 
social movement theory from classes linked to industrial production towards a more 
covering mobilization of the civil society has so created a new class struggle including e.g. 
cultural issues and lifestyle and can so be considered more diversified than Marxist theory 
(Della Porta and Diani, 2006).  
 
What then about the “founding fathers” of social movement theory: Marx, Durkheim, Mill 
and Weber? While Tilly (1978) admits, that the basic understanding for research and 
theories of collective action can be found in the teaching of Marx, Durkheim, Mill and 
Weber, he still considers it hard to even find a red a line that would summarize their 
teachings. Tilly (1978, p. 49) so argue, that: 
“[t]he theories at hand clearly lead in different directions. Yet in many areas they are too incomplete 
or too imprecisely specified to permit either clear confrontations with other theories or decisive 
testing against the facts. Where they are well specified, furthermore, it often turns out that they are 
talking about different things: theories of collective choice apply to situations in which the 
alternatives are limited and well defined; theories of collective behavior refer to what happens when 
the standard choices are suspended, and so forth.”.  
 
4.2 Defining the social mass movement 
At this point, before we will approach the social mass movement, there is some need of 
definitions. As already stated, it is of help to approach the mass movements with two main 
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bases for explanation: base for social movements and campaign done by a social movement 
(Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 19) also points out, that the set of 
questions referring to social movements are not merely peculiar to social movement 
research, but rather it makes more sense “to talk about collective action at large, rather than 
social movements.”. This because collective action refers to individuals within the social 
movement, sharing resources and the same goal, which in their turn can be both collective 
but also interests of specific reference groups (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Accordingly, 
the labelling of the colour revolutions as social mass movements can be criticized, and not 
only the social movements but also collective action has to been taken into consideration. 
This as “analyses of collective action and analyses of social movements are inextricably 
linked.” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 19).  
 
As will be shown in chapters on, it is questionable to talk about a homogenous social mass 
movement in Georgia after 2003, and indeed the question can be asked if what happened in 
2003 really was a mass movement or rather a political game with a favourable outcome for 
the main opposition party. Nevertheless, we are approaching the organizations as a 
movement, as their common goal is (and has been) the fight against the political elite.  
 
Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 20) describe that there are three main mechanisms that are 
distinctive about social movements: the conflictual collective action, the dense informal 
networks, and the collective identity. Further, informal (or formal) networks are, especially 
in a global world, of big importance and no single organization can so claim to represent a 
movement alone. On the other hand, it is negotiations, co-work and a common defined 
strategy that is the ground for possible collective action occurring. The more the action is 
collective, and not concentrated to a formal organization, the bigger are the opportunities to 
reach the common goal. Collective identity is further part of the formation of formal and 
informal networks, as the actors are bound by a common goal and have a common 
opponent. Still, these links do not necessarily include a common identity. It is therefore not 
the networks themselves that include a common identity, but it occurs in the resource 
mobilization and campaigning. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, pp. 20-24.) 
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McCarthy and Zald (1977, p. 20) have defined a social mass movement as the following: 
“Complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social 
movement or countermovement and attempts to implement those goals”. Wilkinson (1971, 
p. 27) again has maybe presented one of the most formal and explicit definition by 
describing a social movement as:  
“…a deliberate collective endeavor to promote change in any direction and by any means, not 
excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into ‘utopian’ community … A social 
movement must evince a minimal degree of organization, though this may range from a loose, 
informal or partial level of organization to the highly institutionalized and bureaucratized movement 
and the corporate group … A social movement’s commitment to change and the raison d’étre of its 
organization are founded upon the conscious volition, normative commitment to the movement’s 
aims and beliefs, and active participation on the part of the followers or members.”. 
Taking these authors, just representing a part of the field of researchers on social mass 
movements, we can find some specifics of interest. The social movement should have some 
kind of formal organization and boarders, but these borders can indeed be blur depending 
on how the researcher approach the movement. Additionally, a line between social 
movements, political parties and interest groups should be drawn to separate the movement 
from other similar objects. The main difference between social movement and parties and 
other organizations, does, according to Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 25),  
“not consist primarily of differences in organizational characteristics or patterns of behavior, but of 
the fact that social movements are not organizations, not even of a peculiar kind … [but] they are 
networks which may either include formal organizations or not, depending on shifting 
circumstances.”.  
A social movement according to Della Porta and Diani (2006) should therefore not be 
compared with single organizations or groups, as functions as movement strategy, tactics, 
leadership, membership and recruitment are not the same within crowds and collectives as 
within e.g. parties or interest groups. Again, the focus is slightly moved from the 
organization and the structure to the collective identity as this sense of collective identity or 
collective belonging is the link between the participants and the structure of the 
organization are built upon collective identity, while in the same time collective identity 
also appears from the structure and mobilization.  
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Following this, we can draw a line between social mass movement and social movement 
organizations. Social movement can still be part of a social mass movement, and among the 
actors can even political parties, community groups and interest groups be found. Political 
parties so play a dual role and “will be part of two different systems of action (the party 
system and the social movement system), where they will play different roles” (Della Porta 
and Diani, 2006, p. 27).  
 
Taking into consideration the different, but alike, definitions on social mass movements it 
can be concluded, that the social mass movement is built on two foundations: base (i.e. 
organizational structure, networks) and campaign (participation). The organizational 
structure differs from e.g. a political party and the borders are diffuse. Still the organization 
cannot only be a crowd of participants as there has to be some kind of organizational 
structure (e.g. the difference between a crowd gathered for a concert on the central square 
or the same crowd gathered for a planned and organized demonstration). The participants 
gather around one common goal, or against a common enemy (could be an object, but also 
a physical person). The participants will, to some extent, share some kind of common 
identity, but this identity does not have to define or strict. A final definition on what a 
social mass movement is would be a complex summarization of all researcher explaining 
the phenomena, and it would probably be easier to conclude on what a social mass 
movement is not, rather than is. At this point, it has also to be stated, that the term social 
mass movement is applicable on any organized mass meeting its criteria, and the common 
goal of the movement does not define it as a movement, but rather the organizational 
structure. As an example a pro-governmental movement supporting the authoritarian ruling 
elite is just as much a social mass movement as an anti-governmental movement fighting 
for democratization (i.e., as long as these are not formal political parties). 
 
4.3 Approaching the social mass movement 
In the next part four different aspects of the social mass movement have been chosen as 
support in approaching the object for research; organization of the movement, mobilization 
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of members, existing formal and informal networks and collective identity. These aspects 
have been chosen on the base of Della Porta’s and Diana’s (2006) view on how to study 
social mass movements.  
 
4.3.1 Organization and participation  
A social movement does not always have to be a formal organization as many times the 
movement include different interest groups and formal or informal organizations. The 
social movement can be considered the umbrella of smaller clusters, and by developing 
symbols and goals, different interest groups gather around one common cause. (Della Porta 
and Diani, 2006.) Scott (1981, p. 9) claims, that  
“organizations active in social movement fulfill – if to varying degrees and in varying combinations 
– a number of functions: including participants to offer their services; defining organization aims; 
managing and coordinating contributions; collecting resources from the surrounding environment; 
selecting, training, and replacing members.”.  
Scott (1981) further has divided social movement organizations into three blocks: rational, 
natural and open systems. According to the first model, the organization has a rather formal 
structure and includes different interest groups oriented around the same cause. In the 
second model, the participants are not as much affected by the formal organization as in the 
first model, but rather, as Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 138) shows, share “an interest in 
the survival of the system and engage in activities, coordinated informally, to secure such 
survival”. The third model as of Scot (1981) has an informal structure where participants 
are not necessarily bound to the organization but through negotiations, the common goal to 
be reached while the outcome is strongly affected by the local context. As Della Porta and 
Diani (2006) points out, Scot’s divisions are analytical but not empirical descriptions. This 
is why elements of all three models can be found within the same organization depending 
on the level of participation.  
 
The leadership within the social movement organization may differ from case to case; it is 
either hierarchical, horizontal or a mixture of the both (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). 
Leadership is further not only created through decision-making within the movement but 
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through the contacts to the outside world: “[L]eadership may be associated with actors’ 
ability to promote coalition work among movement organizations, or to establish 
connections to the media and political institutions, which in turn lead to operating de facto 
as movement ‘representatives’” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 143). Social mass 
movements might have a tendency towards horizontal structures, but on a public 
representational level most organization do need a specified leadership (Della Porta and 
Diani, 2006). Nevertheless, leadership within a social movement organization can be rather 
informal and unlimited, as this leadership is more representative than final. Comparing this 
to the Rose Revolution in 2003, Mikheil Saakashvili was clearly the leader of the 
opposition movement, but he was also the leader of his party Movement for National Unity. 
In this way, leadership can indeed be formal, if the movement or a part of the moment (in 
the Georgian case opposition party MNU) has an organized structure. Still, even in 2003, 
there were other party fighting to get to power as well, but Saakashvili turned out to be the 
strongest leader.  
 
A social movement organization can also be divided in professional and participatory 
organizations. The first group, professional movement organization, represents a strong and 
formal leadership and a restricted membership base. In these kinds of organizations, 
ordinary members do not have much power in changing or affecting the policymaking of 
the community. Formal or professional organizations do have big opportunities to succeed 
in reaching their goals, while an established political system may negatively affect the 
mobilization capacity of such organizations. The second group, participatory organizations, 
can further be divided into mass protest and grassroots organizations. As the professional 
organization in many cases has seen to be too formal, other organization has chosen a more 
participation-based informal horizontal structure. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, pp. 145-
150.) The ideal profession or participatory organization is still to be found. As will be seen 
in the Georgian case, the organizations included in this study are according to this division 
a mixture of both professional and participatory organizations, and leadership in the 
participatory organization more ad hoc than formal. The ad hoc diffuse leadership in 
participatory organizations may to some extent be of a positive character, as Della Porta 
and Diani (2006) argues that a formal structure of leadership, even if in an informal 
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organization, has in many cases not always been a blessing. Grassroots organizations still 
often suffer from lack of resources, but have, especially in countries with a low level of 
civil society, been successful in mobilizing people around a common cause (Della Porta 
and Diani, 2006). 
 
As a movement consisting of organizations, be it then formal, informal or semi-formal, the 
end of the path still often lies in either institutionalization or dissolvent (Della Porta and 
Diani, 2006). As Della Porta and Diani (2006) suggest, it is not even necessary for a social 
mass movement to become “formalized” or institutionalized if it has once already reached 
its goal. In fact, Della Porta and Diani (2006) observe, that few movements in reality 
survive for a significant time; some of the dissolve because their needs have been met, 
other dissolve due to schisms in leadership or demobilization. Additionally, some 
movements become more moderate, other radicalizes and creates an even more ambitious 
agenda. Concerning social mass movements with a political agenda, this can be considered 
a quite normal fate. If the movement succeed in its endeavours, there is no need for the 
organization structure. Still, the organizations within the movements will not disappear but 
continue to work for other causes or reconstruct themselves to e.g. institutes or agencies. 
Social mass movement can in theory also turn themselves also into national parties, if they 
already were not part of any political party. The further development of the social mass 
movement is therefore highly depending on the opportunities offered by the political 
system and the national context. 
 
Individual participation in social movements is not restricted to only membership, but by 
participating in social movements and their actions, “the political dimension of action 
intersects and overlaps with the private dimension, to generate the foundations of a specific 
form of subculture.” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 131). The chain of participation is a 
chain of continuity and in most cases individuals actively participating and sharing the 
same cause will draw other persons into the same group. The developing subculture is of 
importance to create the “common we” and individual self-realization, as participation in a 
movement’s action (should, to be successful) include not only protest actions but also other 
kind of participation (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).  
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4.3.2 Mobilization and revolution 
Not all mass movements mobilize for revolution. Still, as our focus is set on the Georgian 
society under Saakashvili and the actions of the civil society’s anti-governmental groups we 
are facing attempts to revolution. Huntington (1968, p. 264) writes:  
“A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths 
of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and 
policies. Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and 
wars of independence”.  
Among others, Tilly (1978, p. 193) still criticize Huntington’s definition (that according to 
the author stands as the “norm” of definitions on revolutions) to be too demanding, and sets 
for a simpler one: “A revolutionary outcome is the displacement of one set of power 
holders by another. That simple definition leaves many reference points available: power 
over the means of production, power over symbols, power over government.”. Tilly (1978) 
further points out, that if we use Huntington’s definition of a revolution, or other 
“demanding definitions”, we could almost consider that a true revolution has never 
happened. Tilly (1978) so asks, that we should rather talk about revolutionary situation and 
revolutionary outcomes. 
 
Dames and Forbrig (2006) has in their study on the Ukrainian youth movement Pora! (It is 
time!) concluded, that the movement not only became a successful tool for mobilizing 
people in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution of 2004 but even synonymous with the 
Orange Revolution. The framework for analysis that authors use includes six different 
aspects: framing the campaign and developing Pora’s organizational structure, developing a 
campaign strategy, training activists and developing a volunteer network, conducting the 
information campaign, responding to repression, and mobilizing for free and fair elections  
(Demes and Forbrig, 2006). Further Demes and Forbrig (2006) also points out the 
development of the civil society in Ukraine before the Orange Revolution, as without this 
development it would have been hard (maybe impossible) to develop the organization. 
Once again we see, that a mass movement is not emerging in a vacuum, but there is always 
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a context that should not be ignored (or over-emphasized).  
 
Della Porta and Diani (2006) so argue, that when separated events of collective action 
occur in a long-lasting framework and these events can be linked to other separate events 
with the same common goal or identity, we are very close to a social mass movement.  
Even if the single event or episodes of collective action fail, this does not mean that it 
cannot reoccur. As Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 24) points out, if the collective identity 
has been created and individuals (or organizations) feel that they belong to a cause or a 
movement, “the revival of mobilization in relation to the same goals [will be] easier, 
whenever favorable conditions reoccur.”  
 
A social mass movement’s destiny and opportunity to succeed is also depending on the 
number of participants not only involved in its organization but in supporting the cause 
officially through e.g. protest actions (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). As Della Porta and 
Diani (2006) hold, the theory behind “the logic of numbers”, is the same as in 
representative democracies: the more supporters behind a cause (even if not in majority), 
the more attention will the interest group draw to it. Here it has to be added, that in most 
revolutions it is still the majority of the minority that seems to succeed. For a successful 
revolution, a movement might not need a majority of the citizens (in numbers) out on the 
streets, but rather a small fierce minority might just as well succeed. Even if the majority of 
the population will show opposition against the ruling elite, it will not automatically mean 
that the ruling elite will meet the movement’s demands. In many cases, the ruling elite may 
change its position, while in other situations it will clash with the movement.  
 
Marches have been one of the main tools used in mobilizing great numbers of supporters to 
demonstrate the power of the social movement. The minority movement so address the 
reference group and gain attention while the movement leaders strive to keep supporters 
committed to the cause throughout the protest actions. To secure that their needs will be 
met the social movement so has to draw attention towards itself through different media 
channels. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.) Della Porta and Diani (2006) admit that social 
mass movement do not always represent the majority of the people. This is why “it would 
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be extremely dangerous for social movements to depend solely on such a logic [the logic of 
numbers]; a logic which does not in any case fully reflect their own concept of democracy, 
which emphasizes participation, not majority vote”  (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 173).  
 
An adopted model of Lipsky to show “the political resource of the powerless” has been 
created by Della Porta and Diani (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 165-168). The first step in 
the model is the protest (not necessarily a protest action but rather a demand for change). In 
these groups, leadership occurs to lead the protest actions and define the common cause. 
When the target of process will correlate with the realities of the reference group, and when 
the leadership so can address, through, media, the reference group, a collective action has 
been born. Media is of big importance as the more visibility the movement gets; the greater 
the changes are for successful development of its actions. Protests are not the only channel 
to address the problem and influence on the political agenda, still they highlight the cause 
and support further action. The modern framework for actions includes boycotts, 
barricades, petitions and demonstrations. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.) The changing 
media filed (with the dramatic growth of use of social media) has also given new channels 
to organizations that lack the needed resource (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Indeed, the 
use of social media can also mean negativity, as the opponent has all the same channels as 
the movement.    
 
Along with the logic of numbers goes also the logic of damage (Della Porta and Diani, 
2006). While many social movements can be considered peaceful movements, some use 
violence and destruction as tools to reach their goals. Strikes and boycotts can be 
considered as soft violence, where the ruling elite will suffer economical loss due to chaos 
in the society. Violent actions in their purest forms, as e.g. destroying state property, is, 
though stigmatized, many times “justified often as a symbolic refusal of an oppressive 
system, but it is also used, as in the anti-austerity riots, to win specific battles, or to obtain 
media attention.”  (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 174). Della Porta and Diani (2006) 
further point out, that by using “stigmatized violent actions” (as riots and destruction of 
state property), the social mass movements have to be careful so their actions will not cause 
a highly negative response in the society. The regime will also most likely answer on such 
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behaviour with direct actions that may cause the social mass movement more harm than if 
they would have used only nonviolent techniques  (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). This is a 
crucial stage, as will be seen also in the Georgian case, as the movement will at some point 
face the question of rule of law. The dilemma for the movement will so be how to carry out 
non-violence protest actions if even the non-violence actions are considering as violations 
of the law? The movement may consider the Constitution or the legal framework as unjust 
and erroneous, infringing the right of citizens, but where will the movement draw the line 
for what is rightfulness and what is not? The question will at this point be philosophical, 
and the line between non-violence and violence blur. According to Della Porta and Diani 
(2006, p. 180) it has been shown, that “the more peaceful and institutional a course of 
unconventional political action is (petitioning, for example) the greater the level of public 
approval.”. The golden mean is so somewhere between non-violence actions that will be 
too weak and extreme actions that will hurt the approval among the citizens. 
 
A strategic option for a social movement is shaping a successful protest action where all 
included forces will be taken into consideration and experiencing themselves as parts of the 
movement community even if they do not share all the common values of the movement 
(Della Porta and Diani, 2006). The common goal has to be the same, but values and 
preferences on actions how to reach the goal can differ depending on the participants’ role 
in the movement. Protest actions support not only the goal of the movement, but also 
internal aims. By finding tactics that build up common values and a common identity, the 
movement will be more successful in creating a loyalty and conviction towards reaching 
the common goal. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.)  
 
The diffusion of protest activities between countries and societies, or rather the diffusion of 
strategic adaption and ideas, is many times crucial for the social movement to succeed or 
create successful demonstration that will bring them closer to their goal (Della Porta and 
Diani, 2006; for more on diffusion of electorate revolutions, see e.g. Bunce, V. J., & 
Wolchik, S. L. (2006b). Diffusion can be both direct or indirect, but the main point is that 
“[i]deas concerning organizational structure, strategies of action, or definitions of the world 
‘travel’ from movement to movement, sector to sector, city to city, center to periphery, and, 
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on occasion, periphery to center.”  (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 186). Diffusion is more 
likely take place between countries that have a high level of geographical, cultural, 
historical and/or structural similarities. In the 21st century, the use of internet and social 
media has speeded up the process of expanding ideas through numerals channels of 
communication. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.) 
 
The protest cycle of a social movement include the different steps a movement goes 
through as well as helps us to understand the evolution of collective action. Protest cycles 
have been shown to include a peak of the conflict that includes:  
“a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a quickened 
pace of innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; a 
combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified interactions 
between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution.” 
(Tarrow, 1994, p. 153).  
Della Porta and Diani (2006) also find, that just as in cultures and economies, there are 
peaks and lows in collective mobilization. According to the authors, the first movement 
emerging demanding e.g. political change will, even if it fails in reaching the goal, lower 
the step and risks for future movements. Accordingly, gained victories will most likely 
support remobilizations (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).  
 
4.3.3 Networking 
Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 115) describes networks as affecting participation in 
collective action, and links between people and interest groups are important as “social 
networks are not only a facilitator but also a product of collective action.”. Further, the 
authors claim, that these networks helps to maintain the action of the movement in the long 
run. While Della Porta and Diani (2006) consider networks to be a main channel for 
mobilization and recruitment of people and they may also support protest actions in 
different places and contexts (i.e. diffusion of ideas and actions). As Della Porta and Diani 
(2006) points out that interaction with other people sharing the same cause creates networks 
that are built on mutual understanding and substantiate a “collective we”.  
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Recruitment through networks is still not an undisputed question. In social movement 
studies it has been pointed out that focusing too much on the role of networks may draw the 
researcher away from “the transmission of cognitive cultural message”, that includes also 
the role of media and creating strong emotional impact to draw also strangers’ attention 
towards the cause of the social movement  (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 121). Della 
Porta and Diani (2006) further find that what is crucial to success is rather the position in 
the network the movement or its actors possess than the network itself. Any movement still 
need to have some kind of network base to not be delimited. The findings on the role of 
networks are so not consistent. Nevertheless, official networks, just as private networks, are 
both in different ways supporting collective action. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.) 
 
Social mass movements are further a product of the context where they emerge. The current 
assertion, according to Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 202), is that “the greater the number 
of actors who share political power (the greater the checks and balances), the greater the 
chance that social movements gain access to the system.”. However, a weak state will (if 
not a revolution happens and the elite is overturned) many times not have the means to 
meet the demands of the social movements. Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 201-206) 
includes sets of territorial decentralization, functional separation of powers, the 
characteristics of the public bureaucracy and the power of the state as matters that will 
affect the appearance and development of social mass movements. Tilly (1978) has further 
argued, that “[a]ll our inquiries into the forms and frequencies of collective action 
eventually lead us back to the question of power.” According to Tilly (1978) so the analysis 
of social movements, mobilization electoral revolutions will not be enough if not power is 
taken into consideration as an affecting factor. A central variable is the openness of the 
decision-making process as this is crucial for a social movement to succeed. In a rather 
open society with healthy democratic political opportunities, the social movement may find 
different ways to influence policymaking, elections or political results. Still, these 
opportunity channels can as well be used by other actors (e.g. the opponents of the mass 
movement) to lobby their agenda and this may become a threat to the movement. (Della 
Porta and Diani, 2006).  
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The social movement further needs skilled players (e.g. leaders) that support good 
relationship with the media are able to “market” the common goal. Therefore, networking 
with media and creating (positive) symbols will support the collective action and raise 
support for the movement. The autonomy of the media plays here an important role, as a 
free and pluralistic media field will raise the opportunities for the movement. (Della Porta 
and Diani, 2006). However, does pluralistic communication channels per se imply a 
supportive actor? In the end, it will be the reference public that approve or disapprove the 
actions of the movement, however it will be covered. For a positive framework among the 
reference public the movement should, in theory, control the media or influence on the 
covering. Still at this point, the independence of the media is questionable.  
 
4.3.4 Collective identity and collective action 
Collective identity within the social mass movement is not an autonomous object, nor 
property but “the process by which social actors recognize themselves – and are recognized 
by other actors – as part of broader groupings, and develop emotional attachments to them 
(Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 91). Collective identity is so, according to Della Porta and 
Diani (2006) including shared goals of the group, values, attitudes, worldviews and even 
lifestyle. It is an essential component in creating a social movement and “[i]dentity plays an 
important role in the explanation of collective action even for those who see in collective 
action a peculiar form of rational behavior.”  (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 113).  
 
The first step in creating a collective identity is identifying the differences between “we” 
and “the other”. This division will include and define the positive characters of the 
collective identity in the movement versus the negative characters of the opponent. Here 
collective identity and the movement network will merge, as the feeling of belonging will 
make it easier for the participants to face risks and opposition. This is why emerging formal 
or informal networks support the development of collective identity and vice versa. Formal 
or informal networks may be part of the organizational structure or ad hoc networks. 
However, they are of big importance to movements working in complex social 
environments. Thirdly, collective identity is being linked with the common past. In this 
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way, the social movement can create a timeline of struggle against the “other”, and connect 
to a common cause. The movement identity does not have to be excluding other identities, 
but rather including gathering as many participants as possible under the movement 
umbrella. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.) 
 
Tilly (1978) identifies five big components in the analysis of collective action: the interests, 
the organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action. The interests include the 
gains and losses a certain group can gain from interaction with other groups. When 
analysing the organization focus is set upon the structure of the organization as well as how 
committed participants are (Tilly, 1978). Mobilization includes the process and actions 
made by the organization. As Tilly (1978, p. 7) points out: “The analysis of mobilization 
deals with the ways that groups acquire resources and make them available for collective 
action.”.  
 
Della Porta and Diani (2006) further observe, that the creation of a collective identity has to 
be based not only on homogenization and self-recognition, but also on mutual recognition 
and social relationships. Positive and negative labelling walks hand in hand. The 
movement’s leaders abilities to develop an identity to be recognized as “different” has to be 
weighted up with imposing “negative and stigmatized definitions of the identity of other 
groups” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 106). Mobilization is made difficult the larger the 
movement gets and social incentives as prestige, respect and friendship will have to change 
their characteristics as the group expand (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). If on the other side, 
the opponent proposes greater incentives, the success of mobilization will further on be 
obscured. Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 24) criticize the question of homogeneity of the 
actors sharing a certain identity and claim that “social movement identity dynamic [is 
existing] to that extent that groups and/or individuals feel part of collectivity, mobilized to 
support or oppose social change.”.   
 
The social movements are not only a phenomena that develops from certain protest events 
or around certain political questions, but only when collective identity has been developed 
that brings along a common purpose to a cause a social movement has been established 
39 
 
(Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Collective identity so become a central establishment in the 
social movement and goes beyond collective action. If collective identity is weak, not only 
the opportunities of the social movement will be small but even the label of social 
movement should be questioned (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).  
 
Tilly (1978) also argues that in the analysis of collective action there are three overlapping 
intersecting areas from which we have to begin our analysis. The first area is including a 
certain group of people and the researcher is interested in how they have been dealing with 
different questions. The second area of interest is a set of beliefs and how these developed. 
The third area includes certain actions and why a certain action happened. Tilly (1978) 
further points out, that analysing collective action often means that we have to deal with at 
least two, or all three, of the different areas. If the basic unit for our study is a certain group, 
the researcher is to analyse the beliefs that certain group had. If the basic unit will be a 
certain event, the researcher will be concerned about at least the group that was represented, 
as well at was actions that happened. Research on collective action in most cases will 
include all the three areas, and in that case, our basic unit will be the movement, including 
the certain group we are interested in analysing, the beliefs and values the group had as 
well as the collective action that developed from that group. (Tilly, 1978.) 
 
Della Porta and Diani (2006) argue that the symbolic invention is a common characteristic 
among social movements. The movement may so take into its use historical events, social 
experience, culture and religion and deliberately, or unconsciously, reform these events to 
fit the particular framework and goal of the movement. These forms of identities do not 
need to have their roots in the historical context, but rather “mix together symbols and 
references deriving from diverse social groups to form a new synthesis.”  (Della Porta & 
Diani, 2006, p. 109).  
 
4.4 The mass movement in its context 
The following model has been created to place the Georgian opposition movement in its 
context. Even if the focus is on the movement itself, the external framework should not be 
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forgotten, nor ignored. The model is a modified, and highly simplified, scheme of the ideas 
of Tilly (1978), Della Porta and Diani (2006) and Uhlin (2006).  
 
On the top of the model we have Tilly’s (1978) three overlapping areas including a group 
of people, set of beliefs and actions. The group of people in our analysis are different anti-
governmental actors in Georgia active under the rule of Saakashvili. The set of beliefs are 
their common goals including, among others, democratization of the Georgian society, the 
fight against excessive use of force, political influence and fair elections. The actions are in 
this thesis are mainly represented by demonstrations, campaigns and movement 
organization activities. Once these three areas meet we can consider that an opposition 
movement has occurred, indeed diffuse, but with some kind of structure and framework. 
Following the line on the left side this movement occurs as a response on a problem, in this 
study the rule of Saakashvili and the disadvantages the movement finds in that political 
system.  
 
Once looking into the opposition movement we find several areas of interest (as explained 
by Della Porta and Diani, 2006), these are symbols, membership, collective identity, 
mobilization, organization structure, internal and external networks, training of members 
and campaign strategy. As will be shown, not all of them will appear in the analysis of the 
interviews, but they all are of different importance for a functioning movement and part of 
mobilization of the movement.  
 
The mass movement will, in theory, through collective action and with a common goal 
hereafter move towards a revolution of some kind. Collective action is also seen at earlier 
stage of the model as collective action defines a movement and vice versa. Collective 
action, collective identity and common goal are so characterises of the moment in the same 
way as they are underlying factors developing and defining the movement. At this stage 
political opportunities and media coverage be affecting factors influencing the potential 
success (Uhlin, 2006). As Uhlin (2006) list, the three main political opportunities are the 
openness or closure of the political system, the presence or absence of elite allies and the 
willingness and capacity of the state leadership to repress the revolution and actions. Just as 
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the political opportunities, media coverage have a significant but, as Della Porta and Diani 
(2006) claimed, not final effect on the movement’s future. At the stage of revolution the 
outcomes are two, failed or successful revolution. If researching the Rose Revolution in 
2003 the final result would have been a return to status quo, as within years after the 
revolution a new movement started to emerge now opposing the post-revolutionary 
government. In our case the result is neither failed or successful revolution, as this final 
product is not of importance to the study. Depending on how you define revolution, the 
second Georgian revolution beginning under the rule of Saakashvili ended in the end of 
2012 when Saakashvili’s party was defeated in Georgia’s parliamentary elections. As 
Saakashvili was not able to run for a third time as president his rule so ended and the 
political elite was exchanged.  
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5 METHODOLGY 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines methodology as either “a body of methods, rules, 
and postulates employed by a discipline: a particular procedure or set of procedures” or 
“the analysis of the principles or procedures of inquiry in a particular field”7. Methodology 
further is a way to combine the theoretical framework with the analysis. The following 
chapter will focus on the procedures being used in this research to bind together theory with 
practice. Firstly, the method used for collecting the data, semi-structured interviews will be 
briefly introduced. Secondly, I will present the procedure of working this material into 
researchable data. To secure the objectiveness of the research and increase validity I will 
also present how I have approached methodological triangulation. The local culture and 
doing research as an outsider will also be covered, as well as ethical questions.  
 
5.1 Semi-structured interviews 
A semi-structured interview is a method of research used in the social sciences. While a 
structured interview has a formalized, limited set of questions, a semi-structured interview 
is flexible, allowing new questions to be brought up during the interview as a result of what 
the interviewee says. The interviewer in a semi-structured interview generally has a 
framework of themes to be explored. (Hirsjärvi and Hurme, 1993.) 
 
The specific topics for the interviewees were prepared in advance, consisting of informal 
grouping of topics and questions that were asked of the interviewees (see Annex C). 
Hirsjärvi and Hurme (1993) points out that the methodological approach with interviews 
that are built on discussions on different subjects in social- and behavioural sciences rarely 
has changed during the last decades, if not centuries. It has been shown, that this method 
gives the interviewee enough freedom and space to react on the questions and talk freely 
about the subject (Hirsjärvi and Hurme, 1993). When creating the methodological 
framework for conducting a research, the researcher has to remember that research is a 
complex object, existing of different steps. At first, there is the problem for which a 
                                               
7 Merriam-Webster Dictionary. (Available: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/methodology. Last 
accessed 30th April, 2016) 
44 
 
solution is asked for. Secondly, arguments have to be found why it is important to solve 
this problem. Thirdly, a method has to be chosen that will support to find a solution and 
implement this decision. When the data is gathered, the collected data should be analysed. 
(Hirsjärvi and Hurme, 1993). 
 
The problem of my research are the actions and characteristics of opposition organizations. 
As sufficient information is not available on the internet, and sufficient information needed 
cannot be gained from former research on the subject, the only way to gain this information 
is to go to the place of action and collect it on place. By observing the organizations in their 
context, and discussing the development and structure of them together with leaders and 
members belonging to them, information can be gained that will be needed for analysing 
their functions. Hirsjärvi and Hurme (1993) argue, that interviews can be used as method in 
those cases, where research is being made on subjects that are fairly new to the field. 
Opposition movements are not new to the social science field, but geographically, the 
Georgian political society is not a high-profile research field. Even if diffusion of ideas and 
patterns within the CIS-countries are at near hand, the local context have to be taken into 
consideration. 
 
The focused interview can be considered as a middle way between open discussion and the 
structured interviews. Its nature can be considered much like the open interview, where a 
relation between the interviewer and interviewee is created to bring forward memories and 
sometimes also emotions. The framework for the discussion is still set beforehand, and the 
researcher has a hypothesis of what he/she will gain from the interview. Forming a 
hypothesis is part of planning the research and the interviews. (Hirsjärvi and Hurme, 1993.) 
Still, in focused interviews when accent is given on picturing, interpreting and forecasting 
the interviewee’s actions the need of a specific hypothesis can, according to Hirsjärvi and 
Hurme (1993, p. 40) be questioned. The questions have so to be formed in such a way, that 
the subject being researched can be approached as easy as possible. The focused interview 
is so semi-structured, as the themes for the interviews are known both of the interviewer 
and interviewee. It is still not as strict as a structured interview, as the subject is not fully 
known and there are holes in this knowledge that the researcher is trying to fill.  (Hirsjärvi 
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and Hurme, 1993).  
 
As the problem for my research is identified, the process continues with creating themes for 
discussion and questions. The four themes in my research are the organization of the 
movements, mobilization, networks and collective identity. According to these subjects I 
questions were formed that would be of help during the interviews. Hirsjärvi and Hurme 
(1993) also discuss the classification of questions. According to them, questions can be 
divided into two groups: fact-questions and opinion-questions. The classification is 
important, as questions where the interviewer is try to find out facts will give different 
outcome as questions where emotions and opinions are in focus. The questions can be of 
both types, but has to at least in the mind of the interviewer be divided so that information 
can be “located” in the right box.  
 
Aalto (2001) discusses the ontology and narratives in in-depth interviewing in political 
science. The line between in-depth interviewing and for example semi-structured 
interviews may be blurred, and I am not taking side if it can be considered as a different 
methodology or not8. According to Aalto (2001), a successful research can be made if the 
researcher knows the context and and identifies the narratives in the interviewee’s stories. 
In these terms, the whole figure is more important than certain facts, and the researcher has 
to take into consideration the identity of the interviewee, as he/she influences the story 
being told. My interviews will lean towards in-depth interviews and the whole picture will 
be taken into consideration, still it is not a clear research done with in-depth interviews but 
rather semi-structured. As Aalto (2010) argue, in-depth interviews that may be considered 
unsuccessful, still tells the researcher something about the nature of the researched object, 
due to the reflective nature of the method. 
 
                                               
8 Aalto (2001) points out that from the 90s on, in-depht interviewing has become more and more considered 
as a different methodology due to its focus on radical ontology and narrative charachter. Still, I consider the 
method also applicable as “a part” of semi-structured interviews. 
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5.2 Implementation 
The data for the analysis was collected during a three-week field trip to Georgia in May 
2011. The time for the sample was chaotic in the capital as heavy protests against the 
presidential regime was under way. This is visible in the interviews as many interviewers 
were keen on discussing the happenings that were taking place on the streets. During the 
weeks, I met with politicians, organization leaders and activists from organizational 
structures that were active during the Rose Revolution in 2003 as well as afterwards under 
the rule of Saakashvili. The data consists of ten semi-structured interviews, where I have 
used common questions for all interviewees, but also given much space to discuss matters 
that are of importance for the interviewees. The four themes that I used as a framework for 
the interviews were organization of the movements, mobilization, existing formal and 
informal network (including partners and sponsors abroad), and relations between 
organization and opposition movements. A trip to the areas was merely necessary, as 
information of Georgian opposition movement is hardly accessed anywhere in Russian or 
English.  
 
During the field trip I also used a research diary, where I marked observations during the 
interviews and informal discussions that was not be recorded on tape. The interviews were 
held in English, Russian and Georgian (in Georgian with a translator). As the sample was 
restricted, I used the “snowball-effect” to get in contact with new people. This kind of 
sample can, according to Beamer (2002), be used especially if the process of selecting cases 
is complicated due to the nature of the research.  
 
5.3 Analysis of collected data 
The three steps that follows after collecting the information needed are the classification, 
analysis and interpretation of the material (Ruusuvuori, Nikander, and Hyvärinen, 2010). 
The three steps are bind together to each other, still separated as different processes in the 
analysis. The interviews were transcripted with the help of a Russian and Georgian 
translator. Those interviews that had been done in Russian and Georgian were further 
translated to English. The first step, classification, was done when the material had been 
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transcripted. As the material was broad, (about 110 pages written transcripts in English) 
there was reason to confine it to create treatable data. This was done by looking for 
similarities, words, phrases and continuing themes so a framework of the material could be 
created. The themes I chose was 1.) Background reasons (e.g. for joining an organization, 
for participating in a protest etc.), 2.) Organizational structure 3.) Mobilization 4.) 
Networking and support. The next step, content analysis, included summarizing, 
generalizing and analysing the material with a close attention to objectivity, reliability, 
validity and hypothesis testing. At this point it will be considered, if the material is 
answering on the research questions. As the thesis is dealing also with historical facts, some 
information may be forgotten in the interviews and some information misinterpreted. The 
interviewee will give information as he/she sees it, and put accent on certain facts (Alastalo 
and Åkerman, 2010). Suggestive information has to be considered suggestive, and not as 
facts, as Alastalo and Åkerman (2010, p. 391) put it, the researcher should throughout the 
process impugn not only the collected information, but also his/her own argumentation and 
facts. When secured about the validity of the research, it is time to move on unto 
interpretation.  
 
5.4 Triangulation 
While reports, archives and observation can be considered non-reactive methods to collect 
information, interviews are highly reactive, meaning that the researcher by his presence is 
involved in the collecting procedure and so influence the collected data (Hirsjärvi and 
Hurme, 1993). It can be discussed, if reactive methods are as objective as non-reactive. To 
secure the validity of the research, I have used different methods. This process, 
triangulation, can include both reactive and non-reactive methods.  Therefore, I have 
“backed up” my interviews with other data from among others OSCE, Freedom House and 
former research on the Georgian society. During my field trip, I tried to gain local sources, 
but due to the language question, this was not a successful project. 
 
Herod (1991) points out, that interviewing foreign elites, rather than non-elites, support the 
use of triangulation in the research. This because elites may provide information, reports, 
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documents that are needed for the triangulation strategy. I do not consider my interviewees 
as pure elites, still it can be considered that they do have more information about the 
election process and activities of the movements during elections then the average citizen. 
This way, they can be considered elites in their own context. 
 
To secure the collected data it might be necessary to get acquainted also with official 
documents, reports and other information not given at the time of the interview. This might 
be of special need concerning historical events or discussions about topics that are delicate 
(Davies, 2001). Davies (2001, p. 77) so points out, that “[q]ualitative historical 
interviewing is really about eliciting first-hand accounts, securing the evidence of 
witnesses, as it were (with the inevitable uncertainties such a metaphor implies).”. The 
sources (in my case reports and former research) used should be reliable, and secondary 
sources (in my case e.g. articles from newspapers) only used as “back-ups”, and not as 
primary sources.   
 
5.5 The local culture and ethical questions 
Opposition organizations leaders can, as already argued, be considered as specialists in 
their field, i.e. foreign elites. When conducting interviews with foreign elites, the 
interviewer faces a different local context and problems that might be absent in his/her 
home country. Herod (1999) contributes to this discussion by reflecting upon the role of the 
interviewee as an outsider. Herod (1999, p. 314) argues, that it has been claimed that 
interviewing foreign elites is a “disadvantage because they [the interviewers] can never 
hope to understand the cultural complexities of that which they are not. In other words, the 
validity of one’s research is seen to be a reflection of one’s positionality.”. It is therefore 
important, that the researcher has enough information and knowledge about the local 
culture. This obstacle I attempted to approach by discussing a lot with people on the streets, 
activist, students and anyone who would be ready to discuss with me the political situation 
in Georgia. This was also done as to be successful in networking and gaining access to 
people I was not possible to approach without the help of locals. Herod (1999) still 
concludes that being an outsider has its own advantages, as this creates a distance between 
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the interviewer and the interviewee. The term in itself is not of importance, but rather 
should the relation between the interviewer and the interviewee involve “a sliding scale of 
intimacy” as the researcher may achieve a positionality as a “pseudo-insider”, changing 
sides if so needed (Herod, 1999, p. 326).  
 
Herod (1999) comments, that even if the research in itself has to be transparent, the 
researcher does not have to be transparent in front of his interviewees. Revealing too much 
of the researcher’s agenda can have a negative influence on the collected data, and rather 
the interviewee should feel important and special than just “one among the others”. This 
question was actual in this research, as I did not hide, neither speak loudly, about the fact 
that information was gathered from different organization and actors, which in some cases 
could be considered as enemies. As the Georgian society is highly politicized in their own 
eyes, I chose in the end not to publish the names of the interviewees as this was partly of no 
interest for the research but rather the organizations per se were of value. The interviewees 
gave me the right to publish their names, but even without the names it would be quite easy 
be figured out who are the political actors behind the answers. The reason for not 
publishing their names are so only of a stylistic approach.  
 
Gender roles in Georgia are quite clear and this could be felt in the (radical) organizations 
where I visited where the majority of both participants and leaders were men. I have further 
not taken gender roles into consideration, but it has to be stated that four of the interviewees 
were women and eight interviewees men.  
 
 
50 
 
 
 
6 THE REVOLUTIONARY ROAD 
6.1 Introduction of the interviewees  
The interviews were made in Tbilisi from 11-31.5.2011 (see Annex B and C for more 
information on the interviews).  
 
Among the interviewees, we find two former politicians, six organizations leaders, three 
activists and one historian. The first politician was working under Shevardnadze as a 
deputy minister but was thrown out of politics when she refused to support the president on 
his foreign policy agenda. During and after the Rose Revolution, she was working closely 
with Saakashvili but later turned down his offer to join the new government. The other 
former politician has been a member of the Georgian parliament and is now working as a 
professor.  
 
The six organization leaders are from very different organizations. Two of them are from 
organizations that were clearly involved in the Rose Revolution in 2003. Several leaders 
from the organizations joined politics after the revolution while these two stayed in the 
organizations working.  
 
One organization leader is from a student organization active at the state university in 
Tbilisi. From the smaller organizations, we have three leaders representing two 
organizations. One of the leaders is involved in politics but also running an human rights 
organization supporting families of children that have been killed by the police. The other 
organization is more radical and actively involved in demonstrations against the 
government.  
 
From the activist field we have three activists, two fathers of murdered sons and one 
activist from a radical movement. Additionally one interview was also made with a 
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Georgian historian. 
 
The interviewees gave permission to publish their names. Nevertheless, the interviewees’ 
positions (politician/organization leader/activist) are of more value than their names, and so 
I have chosen to not publish their names but refer to them according to their position (POL 
– politician, ORG – organization leader, ACT – activist, HIS – historian).  
6.2 Why do they protest?  
One of the reasons for the successful Rose Revolution in 2003 was, according to one of the 
former politicians, that not only did the revolution itself draw young people into politics, 
but also the prospects of doing a political career. The younger generation involved in the 
ruling party Citizens’ Union of Georgia were supporting Shevardnadze but only to such a 
point where their own political careers were not threatened. The opposition was, 
undisputable, powerful and it was easier for opposition parties to work against the ruling 
elite then e.g. after that Saakashvili had come to power. Mobilization of the opposition took 
place as politician changed camps to the growing United National Movement or got in 
close cooperation with Saakashvili (e.g. the second main figure during the revolution, Nino 
Burjanadze, left CUG for UNM in 2003, as well Zurab Zhvania, also former supporter of 
Shevardnadze, joined the movement against the ruling party 2003). The strength for 
opposition was, according to the former politician, the unity they achieved in demanding 
for new presidential elections. After the revolution, the new ruling party (UNM) invested 
much in the young generation as they consider this the most influential voting group in the 
coming years. This as the young and old generation in Georgia have always been the main 
target for the ruling party as the generation 35 – 55 years generally are more supportive 
then other generations of the opposition parties. Post-revolution opposition fighting the new 
ruling party, UNM, did after this struggle in endless attempts to reinvent the Rose 
Revolution: 
“You know in 2003 the opposition I can say that they were even more stronger and active. 
But first of all Shevardnadze’s government wasn’t so strong controlled because this 
government [the Saakashvili government] has good experience how to make revolt and they 
never give you possibility to make this. They control everything.” (POL1) 
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According to one of the organization leaders, considers that the Rose Revolution was a 
turning point in the way that the Georgian people express their political will, and the 
ongoing protests and culture of taking to the streets has after this become nothing 
extraordinary for Georgia:  
“Georgia was always politically active than other places in former Soviet Union. The Rose 
Revolution just created more freedom and now people think that demonstration is a legitimate 
form of political expression … [T]here are two types of people, there is one is more oriented 
on survival and one oriented on self-expression. Before the [Rose] revolution, it was 
unacceptable to express your opinion you could express your opinion in a family, together 
with friends but not publicly. It was like in the Soviet Union and the first years after. Today 
people are more open.” (ORG1) 
The same organization leaders continues, that the Soviet legacy has left it scars in the 
Georgian society and this is today seen for example as weak membership bases in 
organizations. The organizations that many times consist of only elite groups are therefore 
facing problems with attracting the masses as the memory of compulsory party membership 
in Soviet times prevents people from joining organizations today and “people became more 
allergic to such kind of activism so we do not overcome it”. (ORG1). A former politician 
also stress, that the Rose Revolution brought with itself a freedom that was highly 
appreciated and gave the people courage to break with old institutional patterns: 
“It [the Rose Revolution] was the first turning point, when someone was allowed, for 
example, to say to a distinguished professor, "Get out of here, you are no longer interesting to 
us!" … You break idols and you break people who means something for the people. Now the 
same process is going. Kmara, the kmara-process is still going.” (POL2) 
The never-ending question in the Georgian society is, what kind of revolution really took 
place in 2003, and was it even a revolution? Many interviewees consider that what 
happened was not really a revolution, but rather a show where power was, in a democratic 
light, given to Saakashvili. These claims are based on the claims, that Shevardnadze was 
never put to trial for the crimes he was accused of during the revolution: 
“No, of course, it was a performance. It was a complete performance … and so just 
Shevardnadze forced this all at one time to show that the democratic forces are here. It was 
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very convenient and good. This was the only opportunity he had to survive. And the fact that 
he is alive today, living in the residence again … It was all agreed upon.” (POL2) 
“The fact that Shevardnadze, for what he might, he did not want to shed blood. If he would 
not go away peacefully, there would be bloodshed.” (HIS1) 
“But in the end it turned out that he might hand over the power to his successor, but in a 
different way, in a, so to say, a more sophisticated scheme, because he might not wish to 
transfer his power Saakashvili and in the end he got a guarantee of inviolability. No one 
arrested him; there wasn’t a criminal case against him and against his major officials as well 
(ACT2) 
“It was a revolution from the point of view that a lot of people were involved from their 
hearts, and very much like I, did too, were tired of Shevardnadze’s ruling that last 
approximately 30 years … And Shevardnadze agreed with it [demand to step down], agreed 
at the end, because he got a guarantee of preservation.” (ORG6) 
Most of the respondents were critical to the ruling government and claimed that the 
situation in the country had gone worse during the rule of Saakashvili. All interviewees 
(besides the organization leaders for organizations that were active during the Rose 
Revolution) complained about elite corruption, infringement on civil rights, low salaries or 
unemployment, excessive use of force from the authorities, uncertainty about the future of 
the country and unfair political practices. Two background factors have to be mentioned. 
Firstly, more or less, the interviewees can all be considered to be in the opposition (even if 
many of them opposed affiliation to opposition parties). The other underlying reason is 
clearly emotional. During the days of the interviews, demonstrations were under way in 
Tbilisi and there were clashes with the police almost every day that created a chaotic 
situation in the country.  
 
Nevertheless, socio-economic-political factors may not explain the total truth why these 
organizations have occurred, but there is one theme that repeats itself in the interviews; 
violence. When asked, what the difference in the society is in 2011 compared to 2003, one 
activist answer, that it was the first killings that became the starting point: 
“It began in 2006, in 2005-2006 they [the police] were killing people, they killed [name], 
were killing right on the streets, [name], lot of guys. They killed somewhere over a hundred, 
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130 or 150, too, on the streets, so to say, dead guys. Everything started with this. We 
protested.” (ORG4) 
 
6.3 Violence as reason for protests 
Many discussions highlighted that personal experience of injustice and violence were the 
main reasons a person decides to become active and participate in some sort of 
organization. Pressure on the civil society, excessive use of force against citizens, reforms 
and corruption were all subjects that the interviewees brought up as reasons for resisting the 
government. However, experiencing personal injustice becomes a catalyst for mobilizing to 
fight the common enemy.  
“After the “Rose Revolution” everything went wrong in Georgia, the government began to 
frighten people, repressions took place. … 100 young boys were killed in the streets of 
Georgia. …In such a small country like Georgia, half of a million of people have suspected 
sentence, just imagine, and the situation in prisons is horrible. They were forging the 
documents and facts of the cases and putting innocent people in prison.” (ACT2) 
The creation of the human rights organization “Save the Life” was a reaction on the murder 
of a boy in his 20s. According to one of the members of the organization (father of a 
murdered son), president Saakashvili and ministers of the Georgian government had several 
times declared that the Georgian police has the right to use arms without warning if 
someone’s life is in danger. This statement was also confirmed by represents from other 
organizations’ leaders, who claimed that in 2005-2006 over hundred people were shot by 
the police after Saakashvili newly introduced zero-tolerance-politics on crimes, and this 
became a beginning of protests: 
“The new parliament declared no tolerance, to small criminals and to everyone. Shoot, and so 
to say, don’t let your hand tremble.” (ORG4) 
After the shooting of his son, his father tried to recover the case but met resistance. Instead, 
with the help of others, he created an organization to support other families and work 
against injustice:  
“After all these events, I decided to create an organization, which would save the lives of the 
people who would go on fighting against injustice. I sold my son’s belongings and gave all 
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the money to the boys’ families. I have also opened a charity-school for the children whose 
parents had no money for their education…” (ACT2) 
The bridge between these interests of the father of a murdered son and more influencing 
actors became one of the organization leaders interviewed. The organization leader, also 
involved in politics and having several other projects, had more channels and opportunities 
then the father would have had himself. It was never explained what kind of relation the 
activist and the organization leader had before the funding of the organization, but within 
the informal/formal network the lonely father was linked to an established political actors 
and other with a common goal (this “linking” is also explained by Della Porta and Diani, 
2016). The organization has collected information, photos and documents on shootings and 
excessive use of power. Among these are special operations conducted by the government 
with fatal causes, cases where young men have been killed by police officers under obscure 
circumstances with later accusations of forged documents and pressure on witnesses. The 
organization has further collected information on cases where the detainees (polices) in 
murder cases have been pardoned after just a couple of years in prison. On a government 
level, they have worked on creating a commission that would specifically investigate these 
cases. This as according to their statistics about half of the cases with police killings they 
consider, that the police used excessive force and are guilty to the murders. Other actors, as 
the Georgian Ombudsman and several non-governmental organizations, have supported the 
private investigations while many families have been afraid to participate in the work. 
According to the members of the organization, they have taken upon themselves the role of 
investigator as they feel that the state is not protecting its citizens: 
“We must fight because the killers will not punish themselves, they will not return themselves 
a verdict of guilty. They were just the serving staff, the orders were coming from the high 
officials.” (ACT3) 
The leader of the organization “Save the Life” has focused on fighting political violence 
and murders committed by the police and officials. To raise public support and draw 
attention to their agenda, the members are together with the families of murdered family 
members organizing rallies in remembrance of the victims. The leader consider the practice 
of administrative arrest, where the administrative detention has been raised from 15 days 
until 90 days, as one of the big problems in all anti-governmental rallies. Administrative 
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detention is so a powerful government weapon against protesters, as they can be kept away 
from the street for months. Besides the organization Save the Life, the organization leader 
has also founded an institute on equality, which has been addressing international 
organizations and the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to raise 
cases against the Georgian state. As an result of the organizations actions the ECHR has in 
one case concluded, that president Saakashvili wrongly pardoned an officer sentenced to 
prison for killing an innocent citizen9. Another goal has been reducing the numbers of 
killings, which he claims has been successful: 
“…together with families [lists the names] and some others, we have achieved a seriously 
reduced number of, I will not tell that it’s not happening at all, it does, but rarely, seriously 
reduced the number of murders in the street, killings, which directly where encouraged by 
Saakashvili.” (ORG6) 
The question about Georgian prisons is also a recurrent theme for discussion. The stories 
from the interviewees included stories about maltreatment, torture, deaths in prison and 
unequal sentences where some citizens were imprisoned for murder only a couple of years 
but counterfeit gave much longer sentences:  
“Why is it necessary that everybody will go to prison, you can give financial penalty, you can 
[do it some] other way, some ultimate penalty. And why prison, why do we have so many 
people in prison?” (POL1) 
According to the organization leaders and activists, there has under the rule of Saakashvili 
been an abnormal growth of arrested and imprisoned citizens. In cases where a person is 
brought to trial procedural agreements are used to arrest other persons, as well sentences 
are doubled, or tripled, which creates situation where a citizen sentenced for theft can 
receive a sentence on up to 20 years. While in prison, the prisoners are subject to torture 
and a health threating conditions including tuberculosis and infections. The prison 
conditions in Georgia were later highlighted in 2012 after the Gldani prison scandals when 
videos were shown on national television of detainees being physically and sexually abused 
                                               
9 Case of Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia (Application no. 25091/07). ECHR judgement on 26th of April 
2011. (Available: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104636#{"itemid":["001-104636"]}. Last accessed: 
20th April 2016) 
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by guards10.  
 
Another organization leader considers that even if the government can be criticized for its 
actions the rule of law still has to be respected. The organization, already active during the 
Rose Revolution, has always spoken for non-violence actions, and if protesters take to 
violence means against the police forces the authorities have the right to answer to protect 
themselves. After the clashes between the police and anti-government protesters in May 
2011, he comments: 
“It was completely legitimate and government can use as much force as they need to quickly 
crash this [protest] … It’s completely justified to use force against such kind of people, 
especially when they are armed and when they are violently resistant. And my concern is that 
they are not arrested and not put in jail. I think in order to somehow prevent such kind of 
illegal things in the future the violent should be punished” (ORG1) 
Pressure on the civil society seems also to some extent increase support among citizens 
who are not participating in rallies but due to escalations may rethink their decisions. When 
the historian interviewed for this thesis was asked if she was ready to go the protests against 
the government she hesitated, as she could not see the clear message of the opposition. Still, 
if the pressure will increase, she would be ready to go to the streets: 
“If government use forces, of course me and others will go. All people are there, all 
politicians may be there. But if government make like this position, that it will wait. I also 
will be waiting.” (HIS1) 
 
6.4 Movement organization 
The youth movement Kmara’s role as a leading force behind the Rose Revolution is among 
some of the interviewees seen as highly important, though research has found it playing a 
slight secondary role and its importance has been questioned (Lincoln, 2012). Nevertheless, 
                                               
10 The Gldani prison scandal resulted in protests in Tbilisi and the government was claimed to not have taken 
action in time even if warnings about the prison situation had been raised before by both local and foreign 
human rights defenders, as reported by Eurasia. (Available: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65929. Last 
accesed 10th Apri 2016). Overall prison population fell radically by almost 60% between year 2011 and 2013 
to a level even lower then after the Rose Revolution, according to National Statistics Office of Georgia. 
(Available: http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=602&lang=eng). Last accessed 16th April 
2016) 
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the movement was relevantly big and consisted of around 3000 members with a core group 
of 100 persons coordinating and monitoring projects, organizing trainings, representing the 
organization in media etc. One of the Kmara-leaders recalls, that in the beginning the 
organization was mainly a student organization active in the capital, but later, with the help 
of the government of Shevardnadze it also took up activities in the regions and the number 
of members increased. The movement was in close affiliation with, among other 
organizations, Liberty Institute, who supported the organization in the beginning, as well as 
with Serbian Otpor, where the movement’s members underwent training. Just as the Liberty 
Institute, Kmara’s main goal was not to overthrow the government but to secure 
democratization in the future. The organization’s leader comments, that even if the 
transition after Shevardnadze has been harsh to the Georgian people, she herself foresaw 
the way to be tricky and reforms are always painful. Still, the new government never 
finalized their reformations and this is according to her because the falling support 
frightened the elite to go through with their plans. Indeed, also former members from 
Kmara and the Liberty Institute got involved in politics after the revolution, as it had not 
been possible for them to influence politics under Shevardnadze. The Kmara-leader was 
also offered a position under the new government but considered the political lifestyle of 
compromises reluctant: 
“As for me I go on criticizing the government as I always did, when I was in Kmara. I think 
that Kmara was created because it was necessary in that period, the government didn’t give us 
another choice.  … I just want to say that our purpose must not be to fight against the 
government; we must fight for a better life and better conditions.” (ORG2) 
Another organization leader was just as the Kmara-leader offered a high position, but 
refused, as he could not consider himself working for a government that in his eyes was 
legitimate:  
“And the last offer was to become the [deputy minister]. All the time I refused, because in my 
life I will not be working there, where at first I would be required to act against my principles 
and to act against the law. … That’s why I didn’t go there and began to fight for the same 
principles, for the same ideas, for which fought before the [Rose] Revolution.” (ORG6) 
Liberty Institute is a Georgian research centre and civil rights NGO founded in 1996 that 
together with the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) played a 
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significant role during the Rose Revolution (Kandelaki, 2006). According to one of its 
leaders, the institute was founded to support the civil society by focusing on questions as 
civil liberties, freedom of speech, religion, justice and human rights. The institute was 
closely affiliated with Kmara during the revolution and together with the Georgian Young 
Lawyer’s Association supported Kmara both technically and logistically but also with legal 
services where so needed  (Kandelaki, 2006). Nevertheless, the institute was not mainly 
participating in the demonstrations to bring down Shevardnadze:  
“Nobody was ready for the revolution and thought realistically that the revolution might 
happen. … No, we’re not against those plans of revolution, we were preparing for the 
Presidential elections that was scheduled in 2005 … Till the last, maybe just 3 days before, I 
was not for revolution. It depends how you define revolution.” (Ramishvili, 2011) 
After the revolution, many of its leading figures joined politics, while other members 
stayed and worked for the institute. After 2003, the institute has shifted its focus to policy 
research, but finds it problematic to attract funding for its activities as the field of 
organizations applying for foreign funds has drastically grown in Georgia. National support 
is according to the institute’s leader totally out of the picture. 
 
Another organization evolving solely for anti-government actions is the Civil Front 
(formerly named 7th of November in memory of the declaration of state of emergency 
during the demonstration in November 2007). The organization (in 2011 consisting of 100 
active members, mostly young people) were organizing demonstrations around homes, 
villages and cottages of government officials and participated in protest actions against the 
government. The organization is on the streets of Tbilisi considered radical and this has 
created problems as not all opposition forces have agreed on co-working with it due to their 
tactics. The members still claim that it is there constitutional right to defend themselves 
against the riot police: 
“This is because we always say that we will protect our rights. If the government will 
terrorize us, beat, torture … arrest us and so on, we will not succumb to this because it is our 
right, because we do not violate the law. We certainly not.” (ORG5) 
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From 2009 on many of its members were found guilty of crimes against the government 
and, according to the organization’s leaders, served sentences as political prisoners11. At the 
demonstrations in May 2011 when the interview was made, the organization had nonstop 
for four months actively protested against the government and as the leaders commented, 
“were sleeping, walking and eating together” (ORG5). The organization is working in 
cooperation with several opposition parties, but the leaders stress, that the co-work is non-
official and more of a supportive character where they for example join the opposition 
parties’ rallies: 
“We can say that we are working with all those who are fighting for their rights and fighting 
much, so to say really struggling, and not, as some opposition leaders believe that we should 
change, change by, how to say it, by legitimate elections and then Georgia would ratify the 
elections…” (ORG4) 
Civil Front’s actions are, according to the leaders, not violating national laws even if their 
members are sentenced to prison. The opposition parties and other organizations are 
focused on reforming the society by democratic means and negotiations, while the Civil 
Front consider that it is only by concrete actions the society can be changed: 
“Nothing radical, nothing illegal, we do not throw these Molotov cocktails or something, 
yeah. We just do not keep silence, not keeping silence and they just hate us. … We can 
achieve nothing by talks. …We will respond to it [by force], definitely. Because we did not 
violate the law, have not violated yet, and will not violate. But if they provoke us, it is our 
constitutional right to defend ourselves.” (ORG4) 
“Every Georgian is a politician” was a phrase that could often be heard in Tbilisi. The 
Georgian society is by many interviewees characterized for a high level of political 
participation; even if membership in organization is low, participation in anti-governmental 
                                               
11 The concept “political prisoner” was largely used by activists and civil rights organizations for any person 
that had committed a crime at demonstrations or in acts that were clearly anti-governmental. Becoming a 
“political prisoner” was of the other members seen as something honorable and those who had been sentences 
to prison, if only for a couple of days, spoked proudly about it. In 2013 almost 200 political prisoners were 
released under a new amnesty law, according to International Federation for Humans Rights. (Available: 
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/georgia/Georgian-political-prisoners-13043. Last 
accessed: 25th April 2016) 
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protests is high. Universities were during the Rose Revolution one of the main places where 
both governmental and anti-governmental forces were recruiting members (Kandelaki, 
2011), and some existing non-political organizations restructured due to the political 
situation. One of the many organizations existing within the Georgian universities was Fair 
Future, founded by a student at the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University. From the 
beginning, the organization leader was involved in a student organization focusing on 
cultural questions, but with the political turmoil in the country, he and his student fellows 
created the new organization in 2007 to participate in “new generation politics” with a 
political agenda (ORG3). According to the organization leader, the university became 
politicized during the rule of Saakashvili, and because he belonged to the opposition, he 
was prohibited to participate in some activities and meetings at the university. This concern 
was also raised by the Kmara-leader interviewed, who claimed the student unions also 
under the rule of president Shevardnadze were hindering students from joining Kmara. As a 
result, many students were afraid of being expelled from university if they would become 
politically active. The organization Fair Future itself was, nevertheless, not touched by 
university nor outside actors. The students organization was only one among other 
communities existing at the time, and according to its former leader, the success of keeping 
the organization untouched by the government was that its agenda was not focused on 
smearing the government and the President (unlike other student organizations) but on 
reporting both positive and negative views on the ongoing political situation.  
 
The organizations included in the thesis are far from homogenous; many times the only 
common factor that can be found is the implacable hatred for the political elite. Most 
interviewees still acknowledge that if the opposition will not be unified against the common 
object of hatred it will fail in its endeavours. In this political game, also the government 
tries to crack the “invented” homogenous opposition by creating schisms among the 
different actors: 
“…because when there is authoritarian rule and a chance to regime change is serious, serious 
confrontation between the opposition parties are always, always, profitable for the 
government. Of course, I don’t like many of them [other opposition actors], but I will keep to 
myself until the time when the government will change. (ORG6) 
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The same theme, common enemy, is many times reflected in the stories on Shevardnadze. 
The interviewees that were politically active already in 2003 agree that the opposition was 
more united in 2003 then afterwards, but this does was not because all forces supported 
Saakashvili but merely they were against Shevardnadze. The opposition in 2011 is, 
according to some of the interviewees, split and incapable of finding a common language. 
Further, the society has changed so, that the possibilities for a political career have 
individualized also the politicians and opposition leaders are now running their own race 
instead of a common race. Closely with this also stands the political consciousness of the 
people, which one of the former politician finds lacking and even if participation is high 
and the Georgian society is quite active. The society is so robbed of real politics in favour 
for opposition leaders competing for power, and the democratic development has stagnated. 
One of organization leaders comments, that the Georgian society is indeed highly 
individualized, and even if it was possible to gain common support for demonstrations 
against Shevardnadze in 2003 this base for a similar opposition movement has been harder 
to find ever since:  
“Yes, of course in 2003 it was more united and I think it was not really revolution. It was a 
spectacle, it was the play, play on the stage I think. … The opposition nowadays they are not 
together … The bad stuff that in Georgia everyone wants to be the first. So because this the 
opposition is not standing together.” (ORG3)  
 
6.5 Support and coverage 
Both former politicians and organization leaders interviewed agree that foreign support has 
been a part of the Georgian society ever since the renewed independence after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Support from the US, and mainly from the Soros Foundation, for the 
civil society began already in the 90s but after the Rose Revolution the support was mainly 
addressed to the government. The importance of Soros Foundation’s support to the civil 
society and organizations as Kmara is confirmed by a former politician, while she consider 
that overall Western support has altered during the years. After realizing that democracy 
was not increasing in the country, the war against Russia in 2008 and after the end of 
Bush’s presidency, the support no longer was for a person (as the support from Bush had 
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been indirectly to Saakashvili) but changed to opposition programs, investigating 
journalism and programs activating the civic society: 
“I think the attitude changed a little, because they realized that they spend a lot of money but 
this country cannot became like, what it is, a beacon of democracy.” (POL1) 
One of the organizations leaders partly blames the West for not having the right knowledge 
about the Georgian society. Even if he admits, that western organization do not have an 
obligation to be part of the Georgian society or fully understand the internal conflicts, 
support still goes to actors that rather meets the West’s standards then the needs of the 
Georgian society: 
“I said most of civil society organizations are depended on founding and the problem is that 
these foreign donors have no clue what is going on here and have priorities [that ] 
significantly differ from the needs of this society. So you can get some founding for some 
project and nobody from our society knows that you are working for their needs. Because 
some fancy things which are popular in influenced countries are absolutely detached from 
this reality …” (ORG1) 
For youth organization Kmara the question of funds was crucial, as in the beginning the 
members had to pay everything from their own pockets. The members were not paid salary, 
but the department leaders of the organization received financial support according to their 
experiences and knowledge. Kmara, anyhow, got in contact with Soros Foundation and 
through another organization received funds for training 600 regional members in 
“demonstration behaviour”: 
“The training were made in 3 stages, we were teaching young people how nonviolent 
demonstration should have been made, we were explaining to each of our members that it 
was impossible to answer with violence on violence, it was very important.” (ORG2) 
The Civil Front claimed that all the money they were using came from their own members 
(some members even sold their cars to support the organization). At some point, the 
organization had asked for funding from Soros Foundation but were rejected funds as, 
according to the organizations’ leaders, they were too much involved in politics. They 
claim, that for the same reasons also other Western actors have been reluctant to support the 
activities of the organization. The members are working as volunteers for the organization 
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with no salary, the only need for money is mainly for transportation of the members to the 
office or out on the field.  
 
An organization that received national support was the student organization Fair Future. 
Even if the organization was not affiliated to any political party, it received funds from 
politic actors. The organization was sponsored by Arkady “Badri” Patarkatsishvili, a 
famous Georgian businessperson that before his death in 2008 was closely involved in 
internal politics in Georgia: 
“[H]e was sponsoring us and he was paying us money but I even didn’t remember even one 
fact that they tell us ‘do this or do this’. They never order us what to do.  We have the 
meeting with this group who was working with Badri Patarkatsishvili and we ask them for 
money, for sponsor, they ask us the goal and what we are going to be plan. We showed the 
plan, they say okay, it’s quite normal and they decided to sponsor. But they did not touch us, 
they give us full freedom.” (ORG3)  
The interviewees often referred to the media as being controlled by the government and 
some of the respondents had personal experiences of being shut out of media because of 
their political views. One former politician that also worked as a journalist recalls how she 
was shut out of the media work after she turned down president Saakashvili’s offer to 
become a minister in his government: 
“And then one day, Saakashvili said to me, you will be the [minister], but you should 
support our plan that is, that is, the entrance to Tskhinvali, armed, indeed. I said that never, 
I'm not going to support this plan that will destroy Georgia. And then I had to say goodbye 
to my duty and to the University … for me TV was closed, public services were closed to 
me and I was almost considered an enemy of the people.” (POL2) 
The media field has become unsatisfactory in the country since the Rose Revolution, and 
according to some of the politicians and organizations leaders, independent television 
channels have been shut down or are in the possession of pro-government actors: 
“But I think that there is also some democracy, I cannot say that you cannot gather, some 
protest and nobody have you, you can publish something in newspapers. Of course TV is 
controlled by government. ... Newspapers are not controlled so much … So this is like the 
generally, this how to say, discipline for implementations, some rules are strong.”  (POL1) 
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National TV-channel Rustavi 2 is by most of the respondents claimed to be the key pro-
governmental channel, while the TV-channel Imedi was seen to be independent until 2008 
when it was overtaken after the death of its owner, the Georgian media tycoon Badri 
Patarkatsishvili. Only local TV-stations as Caucasia and Maestro (among others) are 
mentioned as independent, these channels still are not broadcasting in the whole country. 
Regarding radio channels there is only one (Radio “Palitra”) radio channel that broadcast 
nationally that the interviewees consider independent, the local radio stations differ in their 
objectivity. According to the interviewees, printed media has been attacked by both 
taxation and claimed governmental monopolization of distribution networks that obstruct 
the media houses and possibilities to function. Several journalist have been hit and injured 
during rallies, additionally, the interviewees have information on journalist that have 
emigrated after being threatened and are now considered to be political refugees.  
 
6.6 Mobilization, risks and networking 
The student organization Fair Future was mobilized during the demonstrations in 
November 2007, formerly focusing on cultural questions now clearly taking stand against 
Saakashvili. Fair Future had only seven official members (the founders) but consisted of 
many participants working for the organization. The demonstrations, followed by a 15-day 
state of emergency, marked the turn of the tide for one of the leaders: 
“So it was bad, the most difficult day in my life when we went to the demonstration on 7th of 
November [2007]. It was like the place where, was like, I don’t [know] how they were 
looking at themselves at this… police, they were like hitting so much the people were like … 
it was quite difficult and quite hard.” (ORG3) 
After the November-protests the leader and his fellow students restructured the 
organization and founded a new one, which they named 1978 in remembrance of year 1978 
when the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR attempted to change the constitutional 
langue in Georgia to Russian. This became the last student organization for the organization 
leader, as he felt that political participation had a negative effect on his life and future 
careers. Nevertheless, after university he realized that his former political activities were 
66 
 
still affecting his life as many young opposition members have been arrested, imprisoned or 
facing problems in their careers because of their involvement in politics:  
“But now I’m back to Georgia and I was looking for job, looking to get the job, but the 
problem why I cannot get the job because is that everywhere I went I worked with students 
organizations … so you are opposition. So there is no place for opposition students and 
people who are opposition, they are sitting at home.” (ORG3) 
The Civil Front consists (in 2011) of among 100 active members. It is not easy to get a 
clear picture what a “member” means to them, but presumably, that is a person who stays 
close to the organization and participate in the actions. Mobilization of members for an 
action happens quick, and during times when there are demonstrations under way the team 
stays together to mobilize immediately. One of the reasons, why 20-30 persons are always 
stays together is because the authorities bug their phones and to gather members by phone 
would not be an option. Being arrested at demonstrations is for the protesters something 
that you have to prepare for. One of the leaders comments after days of protests in 2011: 
“Some of us would been arrested, it’s a fact, we will see. … We know that four or three 
people from the organization will be arrested. And others will get repressed. And today 
students were beaten. This will continue every day.” (ORG5) 
The protests are still not only places where only anti-government protesters gather. Many 
organization leaders and activists talked about anti-opposition forces mobilizing against the 
protesters. Another feature of these anti-opposition forces were “civilian spies” in the 
rallies and around the city centre that would later report on demonstrators: 
“And they [the government] have a lot of such people [civilian spies], they give them salary. 
These people have big salaries and that’s why they are many, police have salaries and such 
people have salaries as well.” (ACT1) 
Before the revolution in 2003, Kmara was mainly mobilizing members in the universities, 
but according to one of its leaders, this was problematic as some students were from 
families supporting the ruling elite. Additionally, other students’ movements supporting 
Shevardnadze were also recruiting student into their rows. Nevertheless, the common goal 
was to influence on the upcoming presidential elections and this added members from the 
universities and also from outside to the organization: 
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“Some people believed that we would achieve our purpose, some people did not. But a lot of 
them used to say: “We come to Kmara, because we believe in you.” (ORG2) 
Kmara-members so used, consciously or unconsciously, informal networks to recruit 
members. Personal connections and people involved telling other people about the 
movements, have been shown to be part of the networks needed for a successful movement 
(Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Kmara was also active in connecting with other parties and 
actors. As a result of the negations was a plan “10 Steps to Liberty”, signed by all 
opposition parties. The plan demanded that whoever (from the opposition) comes to power 
the part would have to fulfil the agreement including reforms, civil rights and freedoms. 
The leaders of Kmara got an offer from Saakashvili to officially join his party UNM and 
even if their goals correlated, the offer was turned down as the leaders did not want to work 
under the influence of any political actor.  
 
One of the interviewees, a former female politician has after her political career tried to 
influence the society by her scandalous approach and vulgar statements on the political 
elite. Her books on Georgian life and politics have been widely praised, but also criticized. 
Her way to politics began in 2001 when she founded a non-governmental organization for 
protection of ethnic minorities. The organization, My Georgia, soon caught president 
Shevardnadze’s attention and called for her to become a deputy minister. With a long 
history with Saakashvili before the Rose Revolution and during the revolution, they worked 
closely together and she promoted him in her broadcasts before she was banned on national 
television after her refusal to become a minister. One of the problems she found in the new 
ruling elite was the young leaders’ lack of experience and unprofessionalism. The same 
unprofessionalism she sees in the new opposition: 
“These [Saakashvili government] are, first of all, young people who do not understand 
nothing, have not passed any school, that is who we are … it is generally a kindergarten. All 
the people who were standing in the street, just now ... it will be dangerous if they come to 
power.”  (POL1) 
The question of membership is still tricky, as the line between official member and 
participant is blur. The leader of Liberty Institute points out, that the institution has never 
had any members (not even during the Rose revolution), even if it was participating in the 
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demonstrations. This also is reflected in the answer of an activist (that was known to have 
been a member and closely affiliated with the organization) when asked if he worked for 
Kmara during the revolution in 2003: “No, I participated. Personally I didn’t support 
Saakashvili, but I supported revolution.” (ACT1).  
 
The local culture and history are many times reflected in the answers of the interviewees. 
Georgia’s uniqueness is being stressed, and the history of Georgia is being used as an 
argument that the people indeed is democratic, but it is the political elite that is corrupted, 
and so “not real Georgian”: 
“So we have democracy in our mentality … Our King David the Builder went into mosques, 
synagogues, respected all of them. We have it. But Misha Saakashvili just tries, tries to erase 
it, tries to change the mentality of the people … Georgians will not exist without faith, 
without traditions. You know, and it should be protected, good, and old, that for so many 
centuries we exist, we must save it.” (ORG4) 
“You know, you probably have been at a feast in Georgia and seen there the toastmaster. Our 
country does not chooses a president, but a toastmaster. … We choose a toastmaster, we have 
the Caucasian mentality.” (POL2) 
 
6.7 Georgia and the world 
Georgia’s relations with Russia are highlighted as soon as politics are discussed. This thesis 
is not focusing on Georgia’s foreign politics but as most interviewees chose to blame both 
Russia and the Western countries for the “failed democracy” I consider it of importance to 
also bring forwards some comments on this theme. Russia is considered to stand behind the 
scenes and negatively influencing the Georgian society in all ways possible: 
 “And everybody says, I do not know whether it is right or not, but even Russian political 
scientist themselves say that the whole process…whole process led by Russian parts, Russian 
official parts. I can’t say.” (HIS1) 
Many interviewees are using the words “sold to Russia” when commenting on Georgia-
Russian relations. These statements are interesting, as it has been shown that Russia’s part 
of foreign direct investments in Georgia has been sinking and Georgia no longer has an 
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energy dependency on Russian energy (Kapanadze, 2014). Nevertheless, Russia is being 
raised of the interviewees as a foreign power investing in the country and so “buying out” 
Georgia: 
“Georgia of course was already sold to Russia a long time ago, but what about this Europe, 
NATO, I think they do not take us … why they need us, for what?” (ORG3). 
“This is the kind of two-faced policy. All have been sold, all is being sold. And Russia buys 
everything. Then why scold Russia. We already criticize Russia and if we do not want 
anything from her, of course we do not want to be part of the Russian Empire, what 
nonsense! But why do we sell everything to Russia? That is terrible.” (HIS1)  
“We are long ago already sold to Russia, the rest is a game.” (POL2) 
Also West gets severe criticism both for supporting Saakashvili to power and later leaving 
Georgia to deal with its own problems. Even if the organizations receive support from 
Western organizations, address the ECHR and to some extent agree that membership in the 
EU and NATO is a positive goal, some of the interviewees find the West’s interference in 
Georgian politics weak and faulty: 
 “When this injustice was happening in our country, the international organizations didn’t 
know anything about it, they didn’t see it and for them Georgia was just a country with its 
democracy struggling against criminals. … Saakashvili has made good PR but the real 
situation in our country is very far from democracy in Europe and the USA.” (POL1) 
“I think that we should ask the West to fold the current situation in the country, because they 
lobbied Saakashvili when he came to power.” (ORG4) 
 
6.8 Religion and society 
The Georgian Orthodox Church was another occurring theme that I find of importance to 
highlight. The Georgian Orthodox Church has a great historical place in the Georgian 
society with it roots from the 4th century12. The head of the church, Catholicos Elias II (also 
transliterated as Ilya or Elijah) has lead the community since 1977. The church has today a 
great influence on the society and among young Georgians a personality cult has developed 
                                               
12 Information retrived from Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Available: 
http://global.britannica.com/topic/Georgian-Orthodox-church. Last accessed: 25th April 2016) 
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around the Patriarch. As part of the collective identity, the religious institution seems to 
play an interesting role as something pure and holy against the corrupted and dirty 
government.   
“The only thing now, though, if you have something pure left for Georgia – that’s the 
Patriarch. This because everyone has some sort of attitude towards religion. I say that I am 
probably half-atheist. I cannot go to the churches, I do not believe that you have to visit all 
these festivals, perform all these liturgies … For me, the Patriarch, it is a holy man, that is the 
only thing that remains something pure and suddenly here they are talking shit about this 
man! You just do not have the right!” (POL2) 
“But the Patriarch cannot come and say that I hate the government, because if you will say 
something bad of the government, the whole Georgia will come and stand with the Patriarch 
and then it will begin the war between Georgians inside, so he will not let this. …  [S]o the 
Georgian Patriarch is everything for whole Georgia.” (ORG3) 
“Patriarch - he is a holy man, the holiest. I do not know what we would have without him, I 
do not know.” (ORG5) 
Most respondents talking about the church commented on the role of the Patriarch and his 
reluctance to support the government during the ongoing demonstrations. The Patriarch was 
supporting Saakashvili when he came to power, but took distance towards the ruling elite 
later during the oppositions’ protests against the president. Nevertheless, according to some 
of the organization leaders, the church is supported directly by the government and receives 
annually funds from the state budget to keep its voice down in state affairs. The church yet 
receives criticism for the religious power it exercise on the people in the name of freedom 
and democracy as it has continuously supported the forces fighting against the government: 
“For example, in 2009 opposition gathered thousands of people on the Dinamo stadium and 
took them to the Trinity Church, that people went out and followed opposition because Ilia 
The Second was going to bless them. … Unfortunately, we often see that our patriarch is busy 
doing some comments about politics, which is not his function.” (ORG1) 
Another interviewee finds, that the Patriarch’s position is not too choose side or call the 
people to a battle against or for someone, but should rather be an institution of peace and 
reconciliation: 
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“The Patriarch should always call for calm and for people to come to terms and everybody 
would go to the same way. … But the fact that a man whom the most of the society trust, they 
look forward with hopes to the Patriarch.” (HIS1) 
One of my respondents who was most critical against the Patriarch is in Georgia infamous 
for her loud criticism of the Patriarch as she has claimed, that Moscow uses the Patriarch to 
put pressure on Tbilisi. Among other accusations, she has accused the Patriarch for his 
misuse of power, that the election of him in 1977 was not legitimate and that the churches 
are hiding former criminals and rapists as clerics (who escaped to the churches in the 90s). 
The reaction from the church has not been merciful: 
“I criticized him and it caused the stir. Ilia The Second, instead of asking the people to calm 
down, said that it was the coming of Antichrist. The priests said that I was against the whole 
church and I was just criticizing our patriarch. … The problem of our society is that Georgian 
parish consists mainly of the youth, they don’t know neither the newest history nor the history 
of orthodoxy, they are just the fans of our patriarch.” (ORG2) 
Also Kapanadze (2014) mentions the connection between the Georgian and Russian 
Orthodox Churches, but does not go that far as claiming the Russian state would somehow 
try to influence in Georgian affairs through religious institutions. Still, Western liberal 
values are not correlating with the teachings of the church, and this might create painful 
schisms once Georgia is trying to fulfil the legislative reforms needed for closer ties to the 
European Union (Kapanadze, 2014). In addition, another organization leader claim, that 
Russia is pressuring the Georgian state through its backdoor and pushing its agenda through 
it: 
“[I]t’s not our Government, it’s the Russian government [who] is using the church as a 
political tool.” (ORG1) 
To what extent Russia is influencing the Georgian state through the Georgian Orthodox 
Church will not be elaborated in this thesis, still the fact stands that religions has an 
important place among Georgians and the church can, and could even more if it so desires, 
put pressure on the ruling elite.  
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7 DISCUSSION 
In the former chapter, some parts and organization of the Georgian opposition moment 
were approached and at this point, there are four area in focus. The first is the framework of 
conflicts and cleavages that have triggered the development of the movement and the 
actions taken. Secondly, we are approaching collective identity and the formation of “we” 
against “the other”. Thirdly, we are facing the process the movement go through where 
values, interests and ideas turn into collective action. This part also includes methods used, 
symbolic production, mobilization and its risks, existing networks and identities within the 
movement. Last, one should not forget the social, political and cultural context the 
movement is emerging in and how these factors are effecting its possibilities to success. 
(Della Porta and Diani, 2006.). 
In the background we still have the research questions and sub-questions of importance for 
the studies: 
3. What are the characteristics of the opposition movement that occurred in Georgia 
after the Rose Revolution?  
4. Can the opposition be defined as a social mass movement or is it merely different 
actors working for different goals? 
Sub-questions: 
- What are the biggest problems in the Georgian society according to the opposition? 
- How has the Georgian political and civic society changed during 2003-2013? 
 
While researchers often have sought the answer on emergence and development of social 
movements by looking at the relationship between the challengers and the power holders, 
Tilly (2002, p. 80) point out that it is of big importance to look further and seek  
“analogies and connections between social movements stricto sensu and other political process 
likewise involving contingent identities, historically constructed frames of shared understanding, and 
pariable political opportunity structure-phenomena such as nationalism, revolution, ethnic conflict, 
and creating of transnational institutions.” 
We should therefore approach the movement as a unit including its context (the 
surrounding political society) as well as other factors that are affecting the movement.  
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The data for the analysis have been 10 semi-structured interviews, collected in Georgia in 
May 2011. As has been pointed out, the development of large protests in Tbilisi in May 
2011 are also reflected in the (sometimes highly emotional) answers of the interviewees. 
This background factor has to be taken into consideration, as emotional statements of 
organization leaders during days when some of their members have been beaten could have 
been quite different a month before, or after, the demonstrations.  
 
The revolutionary waves with non-governmental protests flowed through the country 
mainly in 2007, 2009 and 2011, but the protesters never succeeded in their demands 
(resignation of the president). Only in the parliamentary elections in 2012 president Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s party gets defeated by Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream Movement and 
a peaceful transfer of power happened. According to some of the interviewees, it was the 
unity found in the opposition movement that made it possible in 2003 to achieve its goals, 
but this unity has not been found afterwards. This view still is not supported by former 
research on the Rose Revolution, where it was considered that there were deep tension in 
the opposition movement (Tudoroiu, 2007). The fact, that former organization leaders from 
visible organization as Liberty Institute and Kmara after the Rose Revolution joined politics 
also means, that these leaders possess information and knowledge how to create an anti-
government revolution and can so actively combat new attempts to revolution. The thesis 
does not include interviewees with former “revolutionists” that later got involved in 
politics, for a covering picture of the diffusion of ideas from opposition movement into 
ruling elite this would be of interest.  
 
Political and civil freedoms are of big importance to most of the interviewees and there are 
accusations about elite corruption (even if corruption over all in Georgia had decreased 
dramatically due to Saakashvili’s reforms, the interviewees still claim, that elite corruption 
has occurred instead), infringement on civil rights, unemployment and excessive use of 
force from the authorities. It seems like that even if the respondents claim that the ruling 
elite put pressure on the civil society and there the arena for opposition politics is restricted, 
it has become easier to express ones opinion and the society has become more 
individualized. Still, a result of the individualization may be, that there are more possible 
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leaders and the movement is unable to unify and stand behind just one leadership. In the 
surge of the Rose Revolution, a discussion has also occurred in the Georgian society on the 
authenticity of the revolution. Among most of the interviewees we find accusations, that the 
revolution was not a real democratic revolution, but only a transfer of power from Eduard 
Shevardnadze to Mikheil Saakashvili in a democratic light. Still, returning to the definitions 
on revolution presented in the second chapter, the Rose Revolution in 2003 follows the 
scheme set for revolutions of e.g. McFaul (2006). Again, the events in the Georgian society 
in 2003 do come closer to Tudoroiu’s (2007) definition, where the author claims that the 
so-called revolution was merely a structural reform. This claim stands as a fact also for the 
interviewees and becomes a cause for the organizations to justify their actions and anti-
government demonstrations; as the democratic revolution was a fraud, the government is 
not legitimate.  
 
Besides socio-economic-political factors, violence is pointed out as one of the main 
problems in the society. As Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 26) states, collective identity 
“prevails on links of solidarity and loyalty which can exist between individuals and specific 
groups or associations.”  Personal experience of injustice and violence become a catalyst 
for participation in, and founding of, movement organization and demonstrations. In these 
discussions on violence, there are traces of collective identity. Participants find themselves 
as victims of the regime, and by connecting through formal or informal networks, they find 
communities and organizations where they can scare their own tragedies and together work 
against the common opponent. In a timeframe, the first police shootings took place in 2005 
– 2006, and after this several organizations began to work to protect citizens, raise public 
support and address national and international organizations for support in solving the 
killings committed by police officers. Victimizing so creates a clear “we against them”-
theme, where the citizens are treated unfair by an illegitimate ruling elite. While the former 
organization movements Kmara and Liberty Institute clearly advocate non-violence actions 
against an illegitimate power, organizations as Civil Front consider that it is their 
constitutional rights to defend themselves against the authorities. This way they claim that 
they do not break the law even if their members are sent to prison. Civil Front’s radical 
actions are, as Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 165) puts it, “unorthodox forms of action”. 
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Their activities are not supported by all organizations, still they are fighting the common 
enemy and for the same cause. Della Porta and Diani (2006) have further claimed that civil 
obedience and proclamation of different or new values can positively affect public opinion, 
especially in societies where there are small changes the regime will change without 
interference by the people. Civil Front’s member do to some extent consider it an honour to 
be imprisoned, as this is for them a confirmation of their political activity. Participation in 
actions and demonstrations involves risks for the members, still with the support of the 
organization they seem ready to take on these risks. The border between extreme actions 
and actions having support by the society still seems blur, and as Della Porta and Diani 
(2006, p. 179) claim: “Protest leaders must avoid action that is too extreme if they are to 
win over their target groups within the public, but in doing so they run the risk of losing 
confidence of their protest constituency.”.  
 
Youth organization Kmara’s symbol was widely known during the Rose Revolution in 
2003 and afterwards. The white fist on a black background with the word კმარა (Geo. 
Kmara!; Eng. Enough!) written under it was almost identical to the Serbian youth 
movement Otpor! (Resistance!). Civil Front used textiles (caps, t-shirts etc.) with slogans 
written on them to identify with each other. Even during the demonstrations in 2011, the 
“Kmara-fist” was used on different posters and flyers, in different colours but still the same 
style. These symbols are, and have been, part of unifying objects constructing collective 
identity (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).  
 
Is the Georgian opposition network of different actors in 2011 than a mass movement? We 
find characterises of a social base (as Tilly and Tarrow, 2007, argue there should be both a 
social base and campaign), but the campaign do not directly emerge as a result of the 
movement, but rather as fields of interest of different actors. The different organization 
included represent different areas of the civil society. Civil Front is mostly active in 
mobilizing members for demonstrations. Save the Life again is a human rights organization 
with an agenda supporting families of murdered children and counteract police violence. 
Student organization Fair Future (not active in 2011) was focusing on seminars and cultural 
events, but also participated in demonstrations. Two of the main organizations during the 
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Rose Revolution (Kmara and Liberty Institute) play only a secondary role, if any, in the 
demonstrations in 2011. Kmara and Liberty Institute were not active in the demonstrations 
in 2011, but were both addressing civil right issues and working for a more open society. 
Even if these organizations had a different member base and different agendas, their 
common goal was a change in the society, but the means how this would happen and how it 
should happen differs radically. For a collective “we” there are so only traces, and the only 
common the new Georgian opposition movement organizations had was a common enemy, 
the ruling elite (this remark can be questioned in the case of Liberty Institute, as the 
organization leader to some extent expressed support for the authorities in e.g. the clashes 
between violent protesters and the police). Della Porta and Diani (2006) discuss that it 
might be of importance to talk about collective action rather than of social movements, and 
this might be true also for the movement in Georgia in 2011. Still, can different actions of 
different actors be considered as collective action? Collective actions could be the 
demonstrations, but as they are not organized of the movement per se (as there is no official 
opposition movement), we face the fact that even collective action can be questioned. In the 
end, even the common goal or the common cause stays unclear. What they are against is 
more visible, than what they are for. Comparing the movement with McCarthy and Zald’s 
(1977) definition (that is broad and including), we again find traces of a movement, but 
with unclear leadership, blur boundaries, and almost non-existing degree of organization. 
Could this be the reason why the mass movement in 2003 succeeded but the emerging 
movement after the Rose Revolution did fail repeatedly? The data cannot answer on this 
question, but for further research, this would be of interest.  
 
The organization members, former politicians and activists highly emphasize the negative 
development of the Georgian civil society and the restrictions in political influence under 
the rule of Saakashvili, but do not really come forward with the solution on the problems. It 
seems like the focus have shifted since 2003, and this is why the movement in 2011 is not 
able to create a common goal that would include all the actors needed for a successful 
revolution. In 2003, the object of hatred was Shevardnadze, just as the object of “all evil in 
the country” in 2011 in Saakashvili. Nevertheless, the opposition movement in 2003 had a 
more defined (political) leadership; in 2011 this unifying leadership is missing totally of the 
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picture.  
 
The only organizations that have a clear member base and speak about specific members 
are Kmara and Civil Front, even if Civil Front also seems to mobilize people for 
demonstrations that are not their specific members. For most organizations it so more 
accurate to talk about participation then about membership.  Membership in the Georgian 
opposition movement’s organizations in this study are so vague and undefined. Partly, we 
can in the organizations find traces of “multiple affiliations”. As, Della Porta and Diani 
(2006) claim, “overlapping affiliations” or “multiple affiliations” where a member is 
participating in different organizations is in social movements nothing uncommon, rather 
this can be a positive feature as this supports the spread of information between different 
actors and organizations.  Concerning membership the claim “social movements do not 
have members, but participants” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 26) should not be 
forgotten. Clear membership is of interest, but not crucial for a social movement. This is 
visible in the answer of the organization leader from Liberty Institute when he quickly 
answers, that their organization has never had members. Still, as Della Porta and Diani 
(2006) also states, participation should not be reduced to only one single demonstration or 
action, but should rather be continued and including as the participant will by time get the 
feeling of belonging. This just as the leader of Kmara, who remembered that people came 
to their organization because they believed in it. Believing in an organization does not 
mean you have to join it, but implicitly these new members felt that membership indicated 
belonging, or vice versa. When it comes to the logic of numbers (Della Porta and Diani, 
2006) there are no final numbers on how many citizens participated in the demonstrations 
in 2003, 2009 or 2011 or at other occasions when large numbers of people joined the street. 
At some point, the number do not tell us little about the perspective for success, as a small 
intense crowd in theory could be as successful as a big loose one.  
 
It is not clear, if there are formal and informal networks existing between the Georgian 
movement organization included in this study. The Georgian opposition movement in 2011 
seems rather deconcentrated and unlinked. Della Porta and Diani (2006) acknowledge that 
not all movements that will take their common cause to the streets will survive the clash 
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with the opponent, and a well-structured movement organization support a successful 
outcome. Nevertheless, the organizations are involved in different separate networks, that 
support their agenda and field on interest (e.g. Save the Life have both national and 
international contacts helping them in researching their cases on murdered citizens; Kmara 
cooperated with Serbian Otpor through Liberty Institute). Informal networks can be found 
to that amount, that some of the organization mobilize members for common 
demonstrations.  
 
It can be discussed, to what extent the restrictions on media have influenced (negatively) 
the actions and possibilities of the Georgian opposition movement’s organizations. Della 
Porta and Diani (2006) hold, that the media channels and media coverage is of importance 
for successful actions. There was media coverage of the demonstrations in 2011, but to 
what extent media coverage was objective this thesis will not be able to answer on. The 
interviewees remained sceptical to the level of freedom of TV- and radio channels, but 
additionally, social media channels as Facebook, Russian Vkontakte, YouTube, twitter etc. 
are used to spread information. This might be a reason, that even if media coverage is 
restricted, the information still reach the most of the population. As an example still can be 
told the coverage of the demonstrations outside the parliament house in May 2011. The 
government had given time to the protesters to leave the Rustaveli avenue in front of the 
parliament until midnight 25th of May, as 26th of May was the Independency Day of 
Georgia and a military parade was planned to take place in the city centre. National TV-
channels broadcasted live during the evening and closer to midnight the both “trenches” of 
demonstrates and police were still untouched. When the police, followed by water cannons, 
began to move towards the protesters a quarter to midnight the transmission was 
interrupted.  
 
A specific characteristic of the Georgian society, compared to e.g. Ukraine where also 
opposition movements have appeared, is still the size of the country and the population 
density in the capital. The population of Tbilisi is 1,1 millions, which make up almost a 
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third of the whole Georgian population13. A demonstration in Tbilisi would not go 
unknown in the capital nor in any parts of the country even if all media channels would 
keep quiet about the happenings. The close family relationships in the Georgian society 
also play an interesting role. Sahakyan and Atanesyan (2006) have in their article on 
community relationships and social structure in neighbouring Armenia concluded, that the 
cult of family is strongly represented in many former Soviet state and should not be 
neglected when explaining political behaviour. The same strong family cult can also be 
found in Georgia, where family relationships are holy and even if individualism is rising 
the broader family (including grandparents and close relatives) is still an undisputed 
authority and protection. Family support so play importance, and this control also promote 
the spreading of news from one citizen to another.   
 
Creating a collective identity is a process of including and excluding, promoting the 
group’s participants and a negative identification of members standing outside the group or 
the group’s opponents (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). In the Georgian case, the cultural 
context should not be forgotten. Among the interviewees, and also on the streets, the words 
“real Georgian” were used as characteristics of an ethnic Georgian, behaving according to 
local cultural and social norms. On the other hand, if they consider someone a bad host or a 
person who was not behaving according to the norms this person would be “not a real 
Georgian”. These words was also used by one of the interviewees for Saakashvili, when he 
remembered the rich Georgian history and how their ancestors had respected all religions 
and different kind of people, but how Saakashvili was, compared to them, “not a real 
Georgian”.  
 
Other common statements, that might not be part of collective identity, but still forms the 
framework for how the opposition actors look on the surroundings is their relations towards 
West and Russia as well as their relations to the Georgian Orthodox Church. Russia is 
highlighted as intervening in the society buy “buying out” Georgia from the Georgians. 
These accusations are of interest in the light of the ruling elite (and to some extent Western 
                                               
13As of first of January 2016, there were 3,7 million people living in Georgia, while the population in Tbilisi 
only is 1,1 millions, according to National Statistics Office of Georgia- (Available: 
http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=0&lang=eng. Last accessed 15th April 2016) 
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leader) accusing Russia of intervening in the society by supporting demonstration against 
the ruling elite14. Russian intervening is so used by the authorities to explain why the 
protests occur, while the opposition movement members claim, that it is the government 
that has “sold” the country to Russia. West is being consider as both a possible helper, but 
also a traitor. Many respondents express feelings of despair. They consider that the world 
community has forgotten the Georgian people and that the Western countries do not care 
about the future of Georgia and believe only in Saakashvili and his words.  
 
The role of the Georgian Orthodox Church is interesting, but to use religion as an 
influencing factor for revolution deeper research should made into the theme. In the 
interviewees, there are still traces of a very high trust to the church as an institution, and 
especially to the Patriarch. For the interviewees, the church stands as something holy and 
pure in contrast to the corrupted and evil ruling elite. Nevertheless, there are also 
accusations that the Georgian Orthodox Church as being used by Russia as a backdoor to 
influencing on the Georgian society.  
 
 
   
 
 
                                               
14 During all the demonsrations in 2007, 2009 and 2011 the ruling eltice blamed Russia for intervening in 
Georgian interal affairs. (See e.g. Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-protest-
idUSTRE74P4BC20110526. Last accessed 25th April 2016) 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
This research on characteristics of the Georgian opposition mass movement emerging in 
Georgia after the Rose Revolution brings some answer but also a lot of questions. The 
movement organizations as an unity do have traces of a social mass movement or collective 
action, but is far less united as during the Rose Revolution in 2003. Membership and 
mobilization patterns are indistinct, but the waves of attempts for political change in 
especially 2007, 2009 and 2011 still indicates an ongoing process of protest. Nevertheless, 
there are different goals of interest, rather than a common goal.  
 
The closest to a common goal that can be found among the Georgian protesters in 2011 is 
the resignation of the president and a demand for higher level of political freedoms and 
civil liberties. Strong formal networks are not found among the organizations included in 
the study, and the “opposition movement” seem rather diversified. The organizations in the 
research differs from each other and are active in different fields, though the ruling political 
elite is pointed out as the main reason for the problems in the society. Experiences of 
violence seems to be a strong part of collective identity, as well the organization leaders 
and members opposing the ruling elite define positive characters for the member base 
included in the opposition movement as against the corrupted and unjust authorities. 
Another result of interest is the influence of the Georgian Orthodox Church, still this factor 
would need more research to evaluate the power of religion on politics in Georgia. 
 
As we today know, the Georgian protesters never succeeded in their endeavours with the 
help of demonstrations, but only through democratic elections. Will the Georgian society, 
now through the “real” electoral revolution in 2012 when the regime of Saakashvili was 
defeated, be safely established on the path of democracy? Time will tell. Already during the 
chaotic days in 2011 when protesters clashed with riot police on the street in Tbilisi, 
opposition leader Irakly Alasani commented:  
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“…the era when politicians can just call people on the streets is over. Georgia is building a new 
political culture. People want to determine Georgia's future through elections.”15 
Are the days of colour revolutions so over?  Numerous organizations, political activists and 
opposition movements all over the post-Soviet sphere have learned the colourful tactics, so 
as well have the ruling elites. As last years have shown,  also Georgia’s neighbour Russia 
has been eager on law reforms and restrictions that could, to some extent, obstruct a 
Russian colour revolution. Diffusion of ideas do happen, both among opposition actors as 
well as the ruling elite. President Saakashvili was not overturned through the same tactics 
he himself used to came to power. Was this because he had learned his lessons? Any leader, 
looking to succeed with a revolution or to suppress one, will have some lessons from 
Georgia. Nevertheless, in 2014, the ruling elite in Kiev was forced to meet the demands of 
Ukrainian protesters, still sending the country off on a road of civil war, political chaos and 
economic crises. What would have been the result if the Ukrainian protesters would have 
awaited the promised early elections? Would Ukraine, just as Georgia, gone through a 
peaceful transfer of power? Indeed, the political game for power and influence in the post-
Soviet states is more complicated then at a first sight. Therefore there is a need for further 
research on areas as foreign influence as well as local factors that might not be part of 
diffusion of ideas.  
 
The political game in the post-Soviet sphere is so a game including political actors, 
organization movements, influence of Western and Russian interests, as well as diffusion of 
ideas, lessons and opportunities. Still, the people always remain one of the central actors.  
 
                                               
15 From the article On Rustaveli Avenue, The Economist 2nd June 2011. (Available: 
http://www.economist.com/node/18774744. Last accessed 1st May 2016)  
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ANNEX A: POLITICAL ACTORS IN GEORGIA 
Abashidze, Aslan Leader over the Adjara Autonomous Republic of Georgia 
from 1991 to 2004. 
Burjanadze, Nino Left the ruling party in 2003 and became an opposition 
leader. Has served as acting head of state of Georgia twice 
between the resignations of presidents and presidential 
elections. 
Ivanishvili, Bidzina Georgian businessman serving as Prime Minister of Georgia 
2012 - 2013. Founded and led the Georgian Dream coalition 
that won against the United National Movement in the 2012 
parliamentary elections. 
Gamsakhurdia, Zviad  The first president of Georgia (1991 - 1992). 
Natelashvili, Shalva Leader of the Georgian Labour Party. Supporter of 
Saakashvili and part of the opposition in 2003 but later 
became an opponent to Saakashvili.  
Okruashvili, Irakli Minister of Defence of Georgia 2004-2006 under President 
Mikheil Saakashvili. In 2007 Okruashvili began to criticise 
the incumbent president and formed the opposition party 
Movement for United Georgia. After living in France on 
political asylum he returned to Georgia in 2012.  
Patarkatsishvili, Arkady  A Georgian business tycoon for long time active in Russia. 
Fled prosecution in Russia and was given political asylum in 
Georgia. Supported Saakashvili during the Rose Revolution 
but already from 2006 on supporting the opposition.  
Saakashvili, Mikheil Former minister of justice, leader of United National 
Movement, the third president of Georgia (2003 – 2013) 
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Shevardnadze, Eduard Former first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party and 
second president in the independent Georgia (1995 – 2003) 
Zhvania, Zurab Former speaker of the Georgian parliament, left the 
parliament and ruling party, Citizen’s Union of Georgia, in 
protest against president Shevardnadze in 2001. 
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ANNEX B: INTERVIEWEES 
Place of interviews: Tbilisi, Georgia 
Time: 11-31.5.2011 
Interviewer: Sami Rantamäki 
Interview Date of 
interview 
Profession/status/sex Code  Length of 
interview 
Language of 
interview  
1 17.5.2011 Former politician, professor, female POL1  English 
2 23.5.2011 Former politician, 
journalist, female 
POL2  Russian 
3 28.5.2011 Organization leader, male ORG1  English 
4 18.5.2011 Organization leader, female ORG2  Georgian 
5 28.5.2011 Organization leader, male ORG3  English 
6 25.5.2011 Organization leaders, 
males 
ORG4/
ORG5 
 Russian 
7 16.5.2011 Organization leader, male ORG6  Russian 
8 25.5.2011 Members of organization, male ACT1  Russian 
9 16.5.2011 Members of organization, males ACT2/ 
ACT3 
 Georgian 
10 26.5.2011 Historian, female HIS1  Russian 
 
All interviewees were informed of the use of the interviews and gave the right to publish 
their names and citations. Some of the interviews were made in Georgian with the help of a 
translator, other were made in Russian and English. The sample was gather with the so-
called “snowball effect” as it was not possible in advance to locate the contacts needed. A 
template for the interviews was used, but most of the interviews followed a very free 
structure and the template was altered considering the experiences and history of the 
interviewees.  
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ANNEX C: INTERVIEWS 
TEMPLATE FOR INTERVIEWS 
Introduction to the theme 
 
Presentation of the interviewee 
 
Organization of the movement/organization 
- How is the movement organized? 
- What support has been given to the movement from abroad? 
- What support did they receive nationally? 
- What other movements were (are) existing, what kind of relations exist(ed) between 
the movements – which one were (is) the ”leading movement”? 
- Who had (has) the leadership? 
- Were (are) there branches of the movement? 
- What kind of organization structure did (do) the movement have? 
 
Mobilization 
- How were members recruited? 
- What means “membership” in the movement, i.e. who is considered as a member? 
- How many members did (do) the movement had (have)? 
- Were there special places (e.g. universities, internet forums) where recruitment 
happened?  
- How did e.g. state universities look upon students joining the movement? 
- Were all the members joining the protest actions? 
 
Existing formal and informal networks  
- What are the networks with other youth movements in 1) the country 2) abroad  
- Did the members attend training programs in the country or abroad? What kind of 
programs? Who were the sponsors of these programs? 
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- What relations did (do) the movement have with the foreign actors as Soros 
Foundation and Freedom House? Are there other sponsors? 
- What “models” were used in the protest actions and from where did these models 
have their origin? 
 
Movements’/organizations’ relations to opposition parties  
- Did the organization a) develop as a branch of the opposition movement, b) develop 
by itself and later become a branch of the opposition movement, c) develop as a 
branch of the opposition movement but “run its own race”, d) develop by itself and 
not consider that it has the same agenda as the opposition movement, or e) different 
situation?  
- What are/were the official relations between the opposition movement and the 
organization? 
- What are/were the unofficial relations between the opposition movement and the 
organization? 
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